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True compassion is more than flinging a coin to a beggar; it is not haphazard
and superficial. It comes to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs
restructuring. A true revolution of values will soon look uneasily on the glaring
contrast of poverty and wealth. 1
I. AN EVENTFUL SUMMER
July 2005 was an eventful and atypical summer month; it was a month
of great grief, great thrill, and great expectations. It was a month of great
and inconsolable grief due to transnational terrorist attacks, including the
devastating attacks in London on July 72 and in Egypt on July 23. 3
Likewise, the inexpressible carnage in Iraq continued unabated in July
2005; indeed, the degree of terror in Iraq has reached the utmost bounds
of the imaginable and perhaps gone beyond them. The mindless carnage
in Iraq is a tumultuous consequence of the illegal and silly invasion of
that country by the United States (U.S.) and its now dwindling coalition-
of-the-willing states. Like communism, the inventors of the Iraqi invasion
believe that it was a brilliant idea that could have worked had it been
"done right.' 4 Notwithstanding, terrorism, like other transnational crimes
1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD 148 (James Washington ed., 1992).
2. See London Rocked by Terror Attacks, BBC NEWS U.K. EDITION, July 7, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4659093.stm (reporting on three terrorist blasts on an underground
network and on a double-decker bus in London); see also Alan Cowell, Dozens Killed in
Rush-hour Bombings 56 Minutes of Carnage Wipes out Olympic Joy, INT'L HERALD TRIB.
(Fr.), July 8, 2005, at 1 ("Bomb explosions tore through three subway trains and a red-
painted double-decker bus.., on Thursday, killing at least 37 people in carnage that left
the city stunned and bloodied, but oddly stoic.").
3. See Dan Murphy, Terror Strikes in Egypt, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July
23, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/earlyed/early world072305.htni ("Two
powerful car-bombs struck at the heart of Egypt's $6 billion tourism industry early
Saturday, killing 83 people from at least 5 countries.").
4. For perspectives on the invasion, see generally Jutta Brunnre & Stephen J.
Toope, The Use of Force: International Law After Iraq, 53 INT'L & CoMP. LAW. Q. 785
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such as drug trafficking, represents a serious challenge to the values of
civilization, since civilization is supposed to overcome the savage
aggressiveness of the individual.5
July 2005 was also a month of great thrill, with Bob Geldof and other
musical stars treating the world to a "Live 8" musical jamboree on July 2,
reminiscent of the 1985 "Live Aid" concert that took place in the wake
of the Ethiopian famine. The goal of the "Live 8" concert, attended by such
world figures as Nelson Mandela, Bill Gates, and Kofi Annan, was to
"Make Poverty History"-poverty being an affliction that actually or
potentially includes all other afflictions 6-and, in particular, to raise
awareness of Africa's poverty. Finally, July 2005 was a month of great
expectations: following "Live 8" and related activities, the Group of
Eight (G8) industrial countries 8 was expected to make tangible commitments
towards eradicating or reducing Africa's poverty at their 2005 Gleneagles
July Summit. It is a great tragedy that Africa is being repeatedly acted
upon rather than being an actor in the intemational arena. These outbursts of
sympathies and emotions painfully constitute the collective and vicarious
humiliation of Africa's governments and peoples.
The extent to which the "Live 8" concert and related campaigns
influenced the Gleneagles Summit is unclear; but one outcome of the
Summit was the agreement by the G8 to cancel the debt of the 18
poorest nations, 15 of which are in Africa.9 Under the deal brokered by
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the G8 will fund debts to the World
Bank and the African Development Bank (ADB), while debts to the
(2004); Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of
Iraq in Context, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1 (2004); Henry J. Richardson, II, US. Hegemony,
Race and Oil in Deciding United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27 (2003).
5. Cf SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENT 61-62 (Penguin Books
2004) (1930) ("Civilization has to make every effort to limit man's aggressive drives and
hold down their manifestations through the formation of psychical reactions.").
6. See C. S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 96 (1940).
7. See, e.g., Live 8: Real Serious Music, CBS NEWS ONLINE, July 2, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/02/world/main7O5970.shtnl ("Musicians were taking
to 10 stages from Tokyo to Toronto, Berlin to Johannesburg for a music marathon to
raise awareness of African poverty and pressure the world's most powerful leaders to do
something about it at the [G8] summit in Scotland next week.").
8. The G8 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United
Kingdom (U.K.), and U.S. Id.
9. African countries that will benefit from the debt relief/cancellation are Benin,
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) will be catered for by "existing IMF
resources." The G8 also promised to boost aid for developing countries by
$50 billion (f28.8 billion), to provide rapid and flexible multilateral and
bilateral debt relief for post-conflict countries and to allocate grant
financing for reconstruction needs.' 0
This article examines the promised debt relief and commends the G8
for taking the initiative to assist a continent in crisis. The article, however,
argues that debt relief is far from a complete cure, and that Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) needs more than handouts from the G8 to overcome poverty.
Debt relief is merely the end of the beginning;' 1 it is, at best, a gesture of
support to Africa's effort at meeting human security, which the African
Union (A.U.) defines as "the security of the individual in terms of
satisfaction of his/her basic needs."'12 Africa's problems are conspicuous,
though their solutions seem to defy reason and common sense. There are
three external trajectories to Africa's development crisis: the first is the
debt question; the second is the aid question; and the third is the trade
question. 13 The Blair Commission Report 14 sums up Africa's internal
10. See THE GLENEAGLES COMMUNIQUE, BBC NEWS U.K. EDITION (2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/g8_gleneaglescommunique.pdf (last visited Nov.
5,2005) [hereinafter GLENEAGLES COMMUNIQUi]. See also G8 Leaders Agree $50bn Aid Boost,
BBC NEWS U.K. EDITION, July 8,2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4662297.stm.
11. Cf Joseph Stiglitz, The End of the Beginning, THE GUARDIAN [U.K.], July 12,
2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/hearafrica05/story/0,15756,1526537,00.html
(arguing that debt relief alone won't relieve third-world poverty).
12. African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, Afr. Union art. 1,
para. k, 4th Ord. Sess., (adopted Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://www.africa-union.org
(on file with author) [hereinafter AU Non-Aggression Pact] (stressing that human security
includes "the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions
necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for
human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities
and choices for his/her full development;" id.); see generally GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN
SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE (Caroline Thomas & Peter Wilkin eds., 1999)
(exploring security from a human perspective).
13. See Organization of African Unity, New Partnership for Africa 's Development,
3, (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unitytounion/pdfs/
oau/keydocs/NEPAD.pdf [hereinafter NEPAD] ("Historically accession to the
institutions of the international community, the credit and aid binomial has underlined
the logic of African development."); cf. Algiers Declaration, Org. Afr. Unity, 35th Ord.
Sess., at 7, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.1 (XXXV) (July 12-14, 1999), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/Official-documents/Heads%20of /20State%20Summits/hog/
9HoGAssembly1999.pdf [hereinafter Algiers Declaration]. The OAU states that,
[D]espite the tremendous efforts invested by our countries to reorganize and
restructure their economics at a very high social cost, our economies are
increasingly facing a serious deterioration of the terms of trade, a decline in
international development co-operation, a continuous fall in official development
aid, an exacerbation of the external debt problem and the resurgcncc of
protectionism on the part of the developed countries.
Id.
14. Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for
Africa 16 (2005), available at http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/
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development trajectories thus: "Africa's history over the last fifty years
has been blighted by two areas of weakness. These have been capacity-the
ability to design and deliver policies; and accountability-how well a state
answers to its people." 15 This article will argue that while Africa needs the
international community's support for capacity building, it must take up
the challenge of accountability and pull itself up by its bootstraps.
Part II addresses the debt burden, the long struggle and arguments
(legal and moral) for its relief, and the promised reprieve by the G8, all
in the context of global distributive justice. Part III examines Africa's
other external development trajectories-aid and trade-and argues that
market access offers great potential for Africa's growth, though it is hard
to draw the same conclusion about aid. Part IV focuses on internal dynamics,
including Africa's obstructive regulatory and economic policies, and
calls for a transformative development agenda.
II. DEBT RELIEF AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
After years of painful struggle, the international community, in particular
the G8, finally responded with positive gestures to Africa's debt
problem. Until recently, the G8 had stuck relentlessly to an unchanging
line even in radically changed circumstances. It is reasonable to assume
that the grinding and embarrassing poverty in SSA, arising from the debt
burden and other exogenous and endogenous factors, probably prized the
G8 to finally shift ground. This Part examines the dialectics of Africa's
debt problem and the silver lining that now appears in the hitherto dark
clouds. Its central thesis is that debt relief should not be seen as an act
of mercy but as a response to the demands of distributive justice.
A. Poverty, Debts, and the International Economic System
Why is Africa so poor? Is there a chance that the continent will meet
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)? How has the current
international economic order (IEO)-including the asymmetrical world
economic and trading system-affected Africa's efforts at sustainable
development and the reduction of poverty? What, especially, is the nexus
between debt burden and poverty?
thereport/english/1 1-03-05_cr-report.pdf [hereinafter Our Common Interest].
15. Id. at 14.
1. A Rich Continent Buffeted by Poverty
Africa is a huge paradox. The continent has immense wealth, potential,
market and culture. Twenty percent of its total area is made up of forests,
making it "the planet's second lifeline with fabulous bio-diversity (flora
and fauna).' 6  Africa is endowed with immense mineral and energy
resources such as petroleum, gas, uranium, and hydroelectric basins. Its
mineral reserves account for about 30 percent of global mineral
resources. 17 Yet, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
has announced that, "Africa remains the poorest continent despite being
one of the most richly endowed regions of the world."' 18 The defunct
Organization of African Unity (OAU) had earlier reflected on the
continent's plight in these sobering words: "We have noted, at the close
of the 20th century, that of all the regions of the world, Africa is indeed
the most backward in terms of development from whatever angle it is
viewed and the most vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are
concerned."' 9
Since the "Four Freedoms" speech of Franklin D. Roosevelt, in which
he spoke, inter alia, of "freedom from want,, 20 a frontier of freedom has
grown across the world. The final decades of the 20th century were a
glorious period for the majority of mankind, with the number of people
16. Commission of the Aft. Union (AUC), Our Common Destiny: Guideline
Document 5 (May 2004) [hereinafter Our Common Destiny].
17. See id.
18. NEPAD, supra note 13, 19.
19. Yaound6 Declaration, Org. Afr. Unity, 32d Ord. Sess., 2, O.A.U. Doc.
AHG/Decl.3 (XXXII) (July 8-10, 1996), available at http://www.africa-union.org/
Official documents/Heads%20of/o20State%20Summits/hog/6HoGAssembly 1 996.pdf
[hereinafter Yaound6 Declaration]; cf HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A
FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 201
(2002) (noting the pervasiveness of poverty in Africa and stressing that the
Continent has the lowest economic growth rate of any continent and has lagged far
behind in modernization).
20. Franklin D. Roosevelt said,
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world
founded upon four essential human freedoms... The third is the freedom from
want, which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings
which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants
everywhere in the world.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Four Freedoms Speech (Jan. 6, 1941), in FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 361-62 (1990);
cf. President Harry Truman's 1949 "Fair Deal," aimed at improving the lives of people
inhabiting the underdeveloped areas of the globe. In his famous Point IV Program,
Truman declared: "More than half the people of the world are living in conditions
approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic
life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and
to more prosperous areas." Quoted in ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT:
THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 3 (1995).
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living in extreme poverty reduced to one billion, from one and a half
billion.2' However, behind the frontier of freedom are millions of Africans
who live without the freedom to better their lives. SSA has not shared in
the glow of the past decades; for it, they have been decades of despair.
A few examples of the severe and pervasive poverty in SSA are
warranted,22 but many are not. Stein Ringen believes that Europeans are,
23on average, about 20 times better off today than Africans. Although
Ringen's claim is slightly over-stated, there is no denying that, in certain
communities in some parts of the globe, a privileged group of persons
collectively have vastly more than they need to maintain an adequate
standard of living. On the other hand, massive poverty, unemployment,
crime, homelessness and other pathologies plague SSA and show no
signs of abating.
HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and other communicable but
preventable diseases have further ravaged many African countries; the
AIDS pandemic, in particular, is largely a poverty disease. 4 Like poverty,
Africa's share in these diseases is disproportionate and ought to revolt
the human conscience. Whereas less than 2 million persons live with
HIV/AIDS in Latin America and less than 1 million in Western Europe,
between 25 and 28 million Africans are infected, representing about 70
percent of worldwide infections. 25 Of the 5 million people infected with
HIV/AIDS globally in 2003, 3 million, or 60 percent were Africans,
compared to 30,000, or 6 percent in Western Europe. 6 Africa has so far
lost over 22 million persons to HIV/AIDS. The death toll from other
regions put together is less than 3 million.27
The MDG has become the standard for identifying and measuring
global development objectives in the period up to 2015. Elaborated by
21. Stein Ringen, Band of Hope, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, June 24, 2005, at
3-4.
22. See generally World Bank, Some Interesting Facts About Sub-Saharan Africa
(2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org (on file with author) (last visited Aug. 10,
2005).
23. See Ringen, supra note 21, at 3.
24. See Bill Clinton, The Struggle for the Soul of the 21st Century, Richard
Dimbleby Lecture (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.australianpolitics.com/
news/2001/01-12-14.shtml.
25. See U.N. AIDS & World Health Organization, Aids Epidemic Update 5-13





the United Nations (U.N.) Secretariat in collaboration with the World
Bank, IMF, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the MDG seeks to harmonize reporting on the
development goals set forth in the U.N. Millennium Declaration of 2000.28
It calls for international cooperation to eradicate extreme poverty and
hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality
and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health;
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental
sustainability; and develop global partnerships for development for the
attainment of a more peaceful, just and prosperous world.
Many countries are on track to achieve at least some of the MDGs by
the magic year 2015; but SSA remains steeply behind and is presently
the only continent not on track to meet any of these goals. The MDG Report
for 2005 estimates that there were 815 million hungry people in the
developing world in 2002-9 million less than in 1990; but that the
number has increased by tens of millions in SSA.29 Between 1990 and
2003, the number of underweight children in SSA also increased from
29 million to 37 million.30 The actual statistics may not be known,
particularly as some of the so-called "AIDS victims" may be victims of
malnutrition. In Niger, the world's second poorest country after Sierra
Leone, about 3.5 million people are facing extreme hunger and malnutrition.
According to James Morris, Executive Director of U.N. World Food
Program (WFP), "Whole families are suffering [in Niger] because of a
desperate shortage of food, which has forced them to eat just one meal a
day of maize, leaves or wild fruits.'
About $3,050 billion will be needed to achieve the MDG goals; and at
the current rate of development, many African states are unlikely to meet
this target, due to lack of resources. SSA has witnessed two decades of
negative per capita income growth. Its per capita growth rate was only
1.7 percent in 2003, "much too low to achieve the MDG for poverty
reduction., 32 The growth rate needed to attain the MDG in Africa falls
between 5.6 percent for North Africa and 8 percent for Central and East
Africa. This translates into an investment/Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
28. G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Millennium
Declaration].
29. See U.N. Dev. Programme [UNDP], The Millennium Development Goals
Report 2005, at 8 (2005) [hereinafter MDG REPORT 2005] (arguing that the main reasons
for food shortages in Africa lie in growing populations and poor agricultural
productivity).
30. See id.
31. As Niger's Hunger Crisis Worsens, U.N. Agencies Greatly Increase Emergency
Appeal, U.N. NEws SERVICE, Aug. 3,2005, http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200508030291.htrl.
32. U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Afr. [UNECA], Economic Report on Africa 2004:
Unlocking Africa's Trade Potential, at 2 (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter ERA 2004].
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ratio of about 21 and 46 percent for the two regions, respectively.33 The
entire continent currently has an average of 3.5 percent economic
growth, but twice this figure is necessary for Africa to halve extreme
poverty by 2015.34 The World Bank distressingly concludes that even if
SSA were to achieve a projected growth rate of 1.6 percent per capita, it
would still be at the low end of the developing-country growth spectrum,"" " MD ,35
"inadequate to make much of a dent in poverty and other MDGs.
2. Decades of Unequal Development
Poverty is not a new phenomenon36 and its causes are varied.37 The
IMF lists the following causes: low levels of education, investment and
savings; inadequate health care and nutrition; economic instability,
including high inflation and currency volatility; high budget deficits that
contribute to high interest rates; wars, coups, political instability, and
corruption; lack of a strong, impartial judiciary and rule of law; inefficient,
uncompetitive and corrupt financial systems; protectionist policies that
discourage trade; and debts owed to foreign lenders that cannot be
repaid.38 As expected, the IMF classifies trade liberalization as a victim
rather than a villain and confines the debt crisis to issues of good
governance and economic reforms. Western countries and institutions
often perceive Africa's problems as mainly consequences of some
inscrutable force of nature, compounded by corruption.
The truth is that much, certainly not all, of Africa poverty results from
the 'winner-takes-all' global economic system that is geared towards
protecting the rich at the expense of the poor.39 Decades of unequal
33. See Our Common Destiny, supra note 16, at 8 n. 1.
34. See id.
35. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2004: Realizing the Development
Promise of the Doha Agenda, 43 (2003) [hereinafter Global Economic Prospects 2004].
36. See GARETH STEDMAN JONES, AN END TO POVERTY? A HISTORICAL DEBATE
(2004) (tracing the history of debates on world poverty and relating them to current
discussions and policies); see also JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC
POSSmILrIES FOR OUR TIME (2005) (reflecting on the problem of poverty and calling for
the redistribution of wealth through development).
37. For an extensive discussion of the evidence and underlying causes of poverty
and hunger, see JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION (1989); see
also CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE POLITICS OF
STATE SuRvIVAL 161-86 (1996).
38. See What Causes Poverty?, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2002, at B 11 (quoting the MF).
39. See Susanna Mitchell, Inequality and Poverty-A Spiral of Despair, JUBILEE
RESEARCH, http://www.jubilee2000uk.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (arguing that such a
system has shown itself inherently opposed to redistributive policies).
development and an unfair lEO have contributed to the stalled development
of most developing countries and to poverty. 40 The race to the bottom
fueled by globalization and liberalization has lowered wages in many
countries, "[d]espite efficiency and productivity gains," creating unprecedented
income inequality and a decrease in the standard of living for millions of
people.41
The current LEO was elaborated shortly before the end of World War
II and is symbolized in the trio of the IMF, World Bank and-with the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 199442-the World Trade Organization
(WTO).43 The WTO, in turn, succeeds the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). 44 The lEO was elaborated at a time when most of
Africa, with the exception of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia, was colonized
by the then European powers-Belgium, Britain, France, Portugal, and
Spain. It was the wealth of Africa and the sweat of Africans that developed
Europe, in the same way that the lEO continues to effectively ensure
Africa's subjugation and neo-colonization. The so-called multilateral
system is nothing but a projection of the "Washington Consensus," with
its insistence that "the market is the most rational way to do things
correctly. '" 45 As Joseph Stiglitz eloquently puts it,
40. See generally KUNIBERT RAFFER & H.W. SINGER, THE ECONOMIC NORTH-
SouTH DIVIDE: SIx DECADES OF UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (2001) (analyzing the ways in
which global poverty and unequal development contribute to an increasing global rich-
poor gap).
41. LoRI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 284 (New Press 2d ed. 2004) ("Hunger has
increased during the era of the WTO, not from a lack of food but from a lack of
purchasing power by the poor.").
42. The Uruguay Round was launched in September 1986 in Punta del Este,
Uruguay. It took four years to prepare and seven years to complete in 1994. See Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL ACT].
43. The WTO was established in 1995 to implement principles, rules, and
disciplines of the Uruguay Round. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the [WTO],
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
44. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. GATT 1947 was provisionally
established to expedite the start of international negotiations on tariff reductions and their
implementation, pending ratification and entry into force of the Havana Charter and
establishment of the International Trade Organization (ITO). As the Charter never
entered into force, GATT "was pressed into service by default to fill an institutional
vacuum." Kevin Kennedy, A Review of Globalization and Its Discontent, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 251, 252 (2003).
45. Denis O'Hearn, Tigers and Transnational Corporations: Pathways from the
Periphery?, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NEW PARADIGM
117 (Ronaldo Munck & Denis O'Hearn eds., 1999).
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the net effect of the policies set by the Washington Consensus has all too often
been to benefit the few at the expense of the many, the well-off at the expense
of the poor. In many cases, commercial interests and values have superseded
concern for the environment, democracy, human rights, and social justice.
4 6
The campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO),
which began in the early seventies of the twentieth century, led to the
elaboration of the Declaration on the Establishment of a NIEO.47 The
NIEO had three goals: First, it sought to eliminate developing countries'
economic dependence on developed countries. Second, it sought to
accelerate the development of economies in developing countries based
on the principle of self-reliance. Lastly, it sought to introduce appropriate
institutional changes for the global management of world resources in the
interest of mankind as a whole. In particular, the NIEO espoused an
equitable approach to international trade and economic relations between
developed and developing countries and advocated preferential trade and
investment treatment for developing countries. It also called for debt
relief and grants-based assistance, access to technology transfers, and the
recognition of the right to development.
48
The campaign for a NIEO also led to the adoption of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974 (Charter).4 9 The Charter
aimed to establish a new system of international economic relations
based on equity, sovereign equality, and the interdependent interests of
developed and developing countries.5 ° Some doubts exists whether the
Charter forms part of customary international law-since it was adopted
as a U.N. General Assembly resolution and without universal acceptance. 5'
Nonetheless, the principles embodied in this and similar instruments,
including the Program of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO,
52
46. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 20 (2003).
47. G. A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974) [hereinafter
Declaration on NIEO].
48. See generally RUMU SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE (2d ed. 2002) (chapter seven discussing whether or not there is a human right to
development); Edwin P. Reubens, An Overview of the NIEO, in CHALLENGE OF THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 1, 1 (Edwin P. Reubens ed., 1981).
49. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974) [hereinafter
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties].
50. See ROBERT F. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
AND POWER: A STUDY OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES
92-128 (1979).
51. The Charter was adopted with 99 votes in favor, 8 against, and 29 abstentions.
52. G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974) [hereinafter
"represent an expansion of the movement for permanent sovereignty
over natural resources, and continuation of the legal effort by Southern
countries to find voice and to exercise more power over their political
and economic destinies. 53
The international community subsequently elaborated other
initiatives-multilateral, bilateral, and private-all aimed at promoting
SSA's economic renaissance and alleviating poverty. Past multilateral
initiatives include the U.N. Transport and Communications Decade in
Africa,54 the Industrial Development Decade for Africa,55 and the Program
of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (PAAERD),56
which led to the New Agenda for the Development of Africa (NADAF).
These programs sought to invigorate African development and intensify
global support for its economic reforms. The PAAERD and NADAF
were particularly significant, targeting an average real growth rate of 6
percent of GDP and promoting a number of people-oriented objectives,
such as promoting food production and developing agro-industries and
human resources.
Whether the NIEO changed the development trajectory of international
economic relations and, in particular, whether SSA made any meaningful
gains from these campaigns and programs remains a matter of academic
conjecture.57 Clearly, these initiatives have not succeeded in establishing
legal obligations for the West. Rather, international law has "reinforced
and reproduced the [current] economic and political inequities. 5 8 Some
commentators take the view that the NIEO-based agenda has been
partially successful in practical terms, citing the World Bank and other
multilateral and bilateral institutions that are implementing large-scale
debt relief.59 Others point to the Bretton Woods institutions' Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the World Bank's Comprehensive
Development Framework (CDF), and the Common Country Assessment
Program of Action on NIEO].
53. Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 1, 57 (2004) [hereinafter Deconstructing Development].
54. G.A. Res. 32/160, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/160 (Dec. 19, 1977).
55. G.A. Res. 35/66B, U.N. Doc. A/35/592/Add.3 (Dec. 5, 1980).
56. G.A. Res. S-13/2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/S-13/2 (July 1, 1986) [hereinafter PAAERD].
57. See, e.g., N. S. Rembe, Prospects for the Realisation of the New International
Economic Order: An African Perspective, 17 COMP. & INT'L L. J. SOuTH AFR. 322 (1984)
(examining the NIEO initiative, its prospects, problems facing the realisation of an
equitable and just international economic system, and options and responses of the
African states).
58. See Deconstructing Development, supra note 53, at 7; see generally MOHAMMED
BEDJAOUI, TOwARDs A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979) (discussing the
role of international law in shaping the lEO).
59. See World Bank, The Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
(2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org (on home page, follow topics-economic
policy and debt-topics-HIPC).
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and U.N. Development Assistance Framework (CCA/UNDAF), all of
which "command the attention of decision makers, and make resources
available for each country.
60
Critics have questioned the international financial institutions
[IFIs] so-called debt relief-even from a developing country's
perspective-arguably due to the implicit "moral hazard," particularly if
recipient nations appear to be not credit-worthy and unattractive to
*61investors. Other critics argue that the NIEO is not serving the interests
of Africa's producers and exporters. The World Bank itself estimates
that SSA lost half its market share in exports of primary products between
1970 and 1983.62 As an illustration, whereas a ton of African copper
bought 115 barrels of oil in 1975, it bought only 58 barrels by 1980.
Similarly, a ton of African cocoa could buy 148 barrels of oil in 1975
but only 63 barrels by 1980; and while a ton of African coffee could buy
148 barrels of oil in 1975, it could buy only 82 barrels by 1980.63 The
reason for fluctuations in Africa's fortunes is that developed countries
determine the price of their products as well as those of developing
countries. Africa, says Cameron Duodu, "has been involuntarily locked
into an earnings logjam on the international market, which keeps it poor
when it sells to others, and poor when it buys from them." 64
The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), adopted in 1980 by the now defunct
OAU,65 also noted that the NIEO was flawed and biased against Africa.
Its Preamble opened with the following scathing words:
The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies has been
more sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents of the world. Indeed,
rather than result in an improvement in the economic situation of the continent,
successive strategies have made it stagnate and become more susceptible than
60. Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and
Reality, 17 HARv. HUM. RTS. L.J. 137, 153 (2004).
61. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, Ex-Premier of Singapore Sees Pitfalls in Debt
Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000, at 4; Rumu Sarkar, Critical Essay: Theoretical
Foundations in Development Law: A Reconciliation of Opposites?, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 367, 373 (2005).
62. See World Bank, Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s, at 2 (1989).
63. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BuRDEN 220 (1992).
64. See Cameron Duodu, Africa: The Key is Economic Justice, NEW AFRICAN, July
2005, at 14-15 (also calling on Africa to vertically integrate its industries; id.).
65. Org. Afr. Unity, The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of
Africa, Apr. 28, 1980 [hereinafter LPA], available at http://www.uneca/org/itca/
ariportal/docs/lagosplan.pdf.
other regions to the economic and social crises suffered by the industrialised
countries. Thus, Africa is unable to point to any significant growth rate, or
satisfactory index of general well-being, in the past 20 years. 66
It is doubtful that Africa's situation has changed dramatically for the
better since 1980, largely due to its debt burden.
3. The Debt Burden
The debt burden has remained one of the main obstacles to Africa's
economic recovery67 and has elicited repeated and common concerns in
Africa. In 1990, the OAU adopted the famous Declaration on the Political
and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes
Taking Place in the World,68 stressing: "The continuing plummeting of the
prices of Africa's commodities, skyrocketing of prices of manufactured
goods and the growing burden of external debt and the attendant reverse
flow of resources constitutes external factors which severely constrain our
efforts for economic recovery." 69 That same year, the OAU adopted a
resolution on International Cooperation for African Economic and Social
Recovery and Development,7 ° which expressed serious concern about the
effects of unfair international trade practices, reverse resource flows and
external debts on Africa's development.7
External debts have become a Sword of Damocles hanging over SSA
and preventing it from meeting the basic needs of its teeming population.
Much of SSA's debt dates back to the 1970s and 1980s, when poor
countries borrowed to fund domestic projects because of the commodity
price boom, believing that high prices and export earnings would be
sustained. About 90 percent of Africa's debt consisted of long-term loans
or drawings from the IMF, though most-about 96 percent-was either
66. Id. pmbl.
67. For a discussion of the debt crisis in SSA, see generally Jon H. Sylvester,
Impracticability, Mutual Mistake and Related Contractual Bases for Equitably Adjusting
the External Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 258 (1992); Barry
Eichengreen, Historical Research on International Lending and Debt, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
149 (1991); John A. Bohn, Governmental Response to Third World Debt: The Role of
the Export-Import Bank, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 461 (1985).
68. Org. Aft. Unity, 26th Ord. Sess. O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.1 (XXVI) (July 11,
1990) [hereinafter Declaration on the Socio-Economic Situation in Africa].
69. Id 13.
70. Org. Afr. Unity, 26th Ord. Sess. O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 196 (XXVI) (July 9-11,
1990) [hereinafter Resolution on International Cooperation].
71. Id. at pmbl; cf. Yaound6 Declaration, supra note 19, 10; Ouagadougou
Declaration, Org. Afr. Unity, 34th Ord. Sess. & Afr. Econ. Community (AEC) 2d Ord.
Sess., 2, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/OAU/AEC/Decl.1 (II) (June 10, 1998) [hereinafter
Ouagadougou Declaration].
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publicly contracted or publicly guaranteed.7 2 According to the IMF,
the commodity terms of trade of SSA improved by 76 percent between
1970 and 1980.73 This improvement was also partly a product of the great
oil boom produced by what Okeke calls "the effective cartel strategy of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 74
Trouble started for the borrowing nations when commodity prices
failed to rise in proportion to rising interest rates, which was compounded
by the oil price shocks that led to global recessions. Between 1980 and
1987, for example, SSA experienced a 32 percent decline in the commodity
terms of trade.75 The OAU confirmed these developments in 1991 when it
declared:
The unprecedented collapse of the prices of Africa's commodities and the
consequential deterioration in its terms of trade as well as the mounting
protectionist measures in the markets of the developed countries against exports
from Africa and restrictive business practices are among the major external
causes of Africa's external debt.76
Such outbursts were of little interest to the IFIs, which craftily induced
the debtor states to give "preferred" status to loan re-payments. Korinna
Horta captured the mindset of the IFIs: "Unlike commercial banks, the
[World] Bank does not have to bear the consequences of loans for ill-
conceived projects. Given its status as a preferred creditor, governments
repay their World Bank loans irrespective of the success of the projects
that were financed.,
77
Few countries recovered from the aftershocks; many did not. Africa's
external debt stock continued to rise astronomically and uncontrollably,
from about $60 billion in 1980 to about $257 billion by the end of
1989.78 Africa "spends approximately $13.5 billion per annum repaying
72. See Chris N. Okeke, The Debt Burden: An African Perspective, 35 INT'L LAW.
1489, 1490 n.7 (2001).
73. Joshua Greene, The External Debt Problem of Sub-Saharan Africa table 3
(International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 89/23, 1989).
74. Okeke, supra note 72, at 1495 n.42 (noting that some of the surplus earned by
OPEC members found its way to the industrialized market economies, whose banks
began to have excess liquidity).
75. Douglas Rimmer, External Debt and Structural Adjustment in Tropical Africa,
89 AFR. AFFAIRS 283, 284 (1990).
76. Org. Afr. Unity, 27th Ord. Sess., 2, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.2 (XXVII) (June
3-5, 1991) [hereinafter Declaration on Uruguay Round].
77. Korinna Horta, Rhetoric and Reality: Human Rights and the World Bank, 15
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 227, 241 (2002).
78. See Declaration on the Socio-Economic Situation in Africa, supra note 68, 6.
debts" to IFIs for past loans of questionable legitimacy.79 These debts
are paid in international currencies, earned largely through international
trade. Africa earns very little international currency, because it earns
very little from international trade. One reason for this downward spiral
is that terms of trade are depressed, particularly for primary products
such as minerals, other natural resources, agricultural products, and the
like. A recent survey conducted by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP)
reveals that "primary commodities account for more than two-thirds of
exports in 16 of the 23 top or high priority Sub-Saharan countries with
data."' 80 There has been a general decline in the share of agricultural
products in global trade, 81 due in part to poor policies fostered by
enclave-dependent economies.
Today, about 85 percent of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs) are African. 2  The World Bank and IMF launched the HIPC
Initiative in 1996 to reduce the debts of the world's most severely
indebted countries to "sustainable" levels-ones that poor countries can
afford to service. Some commentators have questioned the effectiveness of
the HIPC initiative, "partly because of the major obstacles of its
implementation. Even the criteria upon which certain African countries
were dropped from the list of HIPCs have been seriously questioned.,
83
The World Bank's definition of "sustainable" has also been criticized for
failing to include new funds that debtors borrow to pay charges on "old"
debts and to run their economies.
Africa has been so crippled in resources that only doses of aid and
new loans have kept it from complete bankruptcy. Even these new
resource inflows are used to repay old debts, leading to net capital
outflows. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) reports that
"roughly 80 cents on every dollar that flowed into Africa from foreign
79. Third World Debt Undermines Development: Reality Check: The Need for
Deeper Debt Cancellation, GLOBAL IssuEs, Apr. 2001, http://www.globalissues.org/
TradeRelated/Debt/ExternalArticles/RealityCheck.asp.
80. U.N. Development Program [UNDP], Human Development Report 2004, at
134 (2004).
81. World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2004, at 5 (2004) (noting,
"While the share of agricultural products was about the same as in the preceding two
years, at 9 per cent, it remained 2 per cent below the average level recorded in the
1990s.").
82. There are currently 38 countries under the HIPC initiative, 32 of them in SSA.
See World Bank, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, Aug. 19, 2005, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/081905.pdf. The African HIPC countries are
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo,
Cote d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Id
83. Okeke, supra note 72, at 1501 (slressing, "The effect of HIPC debt relief is therefore
far less clear in some countries that have benefited from the initiative than in others.").
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loans flowed out as capital flight in the same year. '84 Debt repayment
has also increased dependence in Africa, with food imports increasing
considerably due to a general decline in domestic production. Africa is
now a net importer of food and "currently the largest recipient of food aid
in the world,' 85 which is scandalous for the continent most climatically
suited for food production in the world.
86
B. Justice and Debt Relief
This segment examines the legal and moral imperatives of debt relief,
the first fruits to result from that struggle, and the question of conditionality
vis-6-vis debt relief.
1. The Historicity of Campaigns for Debt Relief
Like poverty, debt forgiveness is not a new concept, but an age-old
answer to the injustice and inequality of capitalism. The Law of Moses,
for example, "instituted a genuine social revolution aimed at preventing
the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few.",87 It called on Jews to
cancel all debts owed them by other Jews every seven years and to
redistribute their wealth every 49 years-Jubilee was the year of liberty
or freedom for every Jew. 88
If one of your countrymen becomes poor and sells some of his property, his
nearest relative is to come and redeem what his countryman has sold.... But if
he does not acquire the means to repay him, what he sold will remain in the
possession of the buyer until the Year of Jubilee. It will be returned in the Jubilee,
and he can then go back to his property.89
84. U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Afr. [UNECA], Economic Report on Africa 2003.
Accelerating the Pace of Development, at 2 (2003) [hereinafter ERA 2003].
85. Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, Afr. Union, 2d Ord.
Sess., pmbl., A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Decl.7 (II) (July 10-12, 2003) [hereinafter
Declaration on Agriculture & Food Security].
86. See id.
87. ANDPt TROCME, JESUS AND THE NONVIOLENT REVOLUTION 14 (Charles E.
Moore ed., Orbis Books exp. ed. 2004) (offering a Christ-centered social ethic and
arguing that Jesus inaugurated the kingdom of God based on the Jubilee principles which
called for a political, economic, and spiritual revolution in response to human need).
88. Cf. Ezekiel 46:17 (New Int'l Version) ("If, however, he makes a gift from his
inheritance to one of his servants, the servant may keep it until the year of freedom; then
it will revert to the prince. His inheritance belongs to his sons only; it is theirs.").
89. Leviticus 25:25, 28 (New Int'l Version).
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Jesus also made these Jubilee commandments a cornerstone of his
teachings. In the famous Lord's Prayer, Jesus described a rigorous equation
between practicing the Jubilee and the grace of God: "Forgive us our
debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors." 90 The parables of the
unmerciful servant and the unjust steward further clarify Jesus's thought
on this point; the former expresses the strict "equation" of the Lord's
Prayer: no mercy for him who has none. 91 "By proclaiming the Jubilee," says
Andrd Trocm, "Jesus wanted to bring about a total social transformation,
with an eye to the future, yet based on the vision of justice God had
already set forth in the past.
92
The initial phase of Africa's struggle with the debt question focused
on favorable debt-servicing programs as opposed to outright debt
cancellation. It is difficult to determine the exact time frame when the
struggle began; but in July 1987, the OAU at its 23rd Ordinary Session
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopted a Declaration on Africa's External
Indebtedness.93 The Declaration examined Africa's mounting debt burden
"in depth"94 and its adverse consequences for the implementation of Africa's
recovery program.95 It stressed the international community's responsibility
to contribute to the improvements of African economies "in order to
enable... Member States to service their debts. 96 It also called for an
international conference on Africa's external debt for creditors and
borrowers to discuss and arrive at "appropriate emergency, short, medium
and long-term solutions to alleviate the debt burden. '97 The OAU directed
the Permanent Steering Committee (PSC) to analyze in detail the issue
of African external indebtedness98 and urged its members "to provide to
the PSC (Technical Committee) all relevant data and information on
their national and regional debts so as to facilitate the formulation and
adoption of an African common position." 99 Then, "the PSC will formulate
concrete proposals for an African Common position on the issue."'
100
90. Matthew 6:12 (New Int'l Version): "For if you forgive men when they sin
against you, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. But if you do not forgive men
their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins." See id. at 14-15.
91. See Matthew 18:21-35 (New Int'l Version).
92. TROCM, supra note 87, at 14.
93. Org. Afr. Unity, 23rd Ord. Sess., O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.3. (XXIII) (July 27-29,
1987) [hereinafter Declaration on Africa's External Indebtedness].
94. Africa's total debt at the end of 1987, including arrears of payments due, was
about $141 billion. See Rimmer, supra note 75, at 283 (citing PERCY S. MISTRY, AFRICAN
DEBT: THE CASE FOR RELIEF FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1988)).
95. Declaration on Africa's External Indebtedness, supra note 93, at pmbl.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. i.
99. Id. T iv.
100. Id. v.
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African states promised to reconvene in an extraordinary session in
the future "to formulate an African common position on the issue."''° In
1989, the OAU passed another resolution renewing its call for an
international conference on Africa's external indebtedness0 2 and appealing
to the international community, especially the creditor countries, to
provide meaningful reductions in Africa's debt stock and debt service
burdens and significant new resource inflows to Africa. 10 3 The impact
of the international conference on Africa's debt is questionable. Still, at
its 25th Ordinary Session in 1989, the OAU adopted a Resolution for an
Enduring Alleviation of Africa's Debt Problems. 1°4 The OAU adopted the
resolution because of concerns with the worsening economic situation in
Africa, due, in part, to "the excruciating debt burden, which has stunted
growth and development and engendered political instability in some
African Countries."' 0 5 The resolution, for the first time, revealed and
welcomed "the various debt initiatives, especially the recent debt
cancellation offers by President Frangois Mitterand of France and
President George Bush of the United States."' 6 The resolution did not
give specifics on these "debt cancellation offers" but it stressed that
"much more debt relief has to be granted to the debt-distressed countries
in Africa."'0 7
The resolution called on the international community "to urgently
evolve a more comprehensive strategy to address all aspects of Africa's
debt problems, both official and commercial loans, on an enduring basis.
'1 8
It urged creditor countries, in particular, to write-off the official debt of
African countries, "in view of their generalized poverty and the attendant
economic structures that are fragile and obsolete together with the low
per capita incomes which now make them qualify as low-income or
101. Id.atpmbl.
102. See Resolution of the Work of the Contact Group of the Current Chairman on
Africa's External Debt Crisis, Org. Afr. Unity, 25th Ord. Sess., 3, AHG/Res. 181
(XXV) (July 24-26, 1989). The OAU recalled another of its resolution-O.A.U. Doc.
AHG/Res. 175 (XXIV) (May 25-28, 1988)--and the mandate given to the Chairman of
that Session regarding the convening of an international conference on Africa's external
indebtedness. Id. pmbl.
103. Id. 4.
104. Org. Afr. Unity, 25th Ord. Sess. O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 185 (XXV) (July 24-26,
1989) [hereinafter Resolution for an Enduring Alleviation of Africa's Debt Problems].




debt distressed countries."' 10 9 The resolution made some specific
recommendations, 1 including "the establishment of an international
debt purchasing institution or agency, under the aegis of the IMF and the
World Bank to purchase the existing commercial bank debt of African
countries at substantial discounts reflecting market rates, while the
discounts so realized should be passed on to the obligators."I'I
In 1996, Africa again called for a "practical and durable solution to the
debt crisis... through a systematic re-appraisal and review of all measures
intended for its servicing and through a concerted search for new,
appropriate solutions commensurate with an equitable promotion of
economic and social progress in all parts of the world."' 1 2 The avalanche
of these soft laws evidences a continent in desperation. NEPAD sums
up Africa's arguments for debt relief thus: "Credit has led to the debt
deadlock, which, from installments to rescheduling, still exists and hinders
the growth of African countries. The limits of this option have been
reached."",13
It was the Jubilee 2000 Movement-an international civil society
campaign-that brought great pressure to bear on the then G8 leaders to
cancel the unpayable debts of the poorest countries by the year 2000,
under a fair and transparent process. The Movement mobilized enormous
international support, including churches throughout the developing
world, 14 by arguing that debt relief is a moral imperative reflecting the
basic principles of economic justice.'15 Its activities radically shifted the
paradigm from favorable debt-servicing conditions to debt relief and
even outright cancellation. In 2001, Chris Okeke argued that "[t]he debt
burden of Africa is so great and the capacity to repay so limited that it is
increasingly necessary to think not in terms of servicing, but in terms of
the idea of complete debt forgiveness." ' 1 6 Africa also began making
strident calls for outright debt cancellation. As recently as January 2005,
the A.U. Assembly called on the G8 to cancel Africa's debt and to take
practical steps to urgently implement such cancellation.1i7
109. Id. 4.
110. See generally id. I 5-8.
111. Id. 8(a).
112. Yaoundd Declaration, supra note 19, 12.
113. NEPAD, supra note 13, 3.
114. STIGLITZ, supra note 46, at 243.
115. See id; see also Jeff M. Sellers, How to Spell Debt Relief CHRIsTIANrrY
TODAY, May 21, 2001, at 64 (describing the Jubilee 2000 Movement's arguments for
debt cancellation).
116. Okeke, supra note 72, at 1501.
117. Decision on the Report of Heads of State and Government Implementation
Committee on NEPAD, Assembly of Afr. Union, 5th Ord. Sess., 3, A.U. Doc.
Assembly/AU/Dec.70 (IV) (Jan. 30-31, 2005) [hereinafter Decision on NEPAD].
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2. The Legal and Moral Arguments for Debt Relief
Scholars and other commentators have explicated both legal and moral
arguments for debt relief, though voices of dissent have also been
audible. As Okeke puts it, "[i]f there are but only good moral arguments
by the South for debt forgiveness unsupported by sound and indisputable
legal case, the whole matter becomes problematic." ' 1 8 In examining the
"legitimacy and legality of debt forgiveness under international law,"
'1 19
Okeke advances the odiousness of debt as a legal argument for its relief.
Citing Alexander Sack, an eminent scholar on the odious debt doctrine, 2
0
he posits: "If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the
interest of the State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the
population that fights against it, etc., this debt is odious for the
population of all the State.' 2' The specific elements of the odious debt
doctrine are: (1) the people did not consent to the borrowing; (2) the
proceeds did not benefit the people; and (3) the creditor knew (1) and (2)
when lending.
122
Other scholars believe that the odious debt doctrine is not a part of
international law. According to Emily Mancina, the doctrine is unsupported
by both treaty law and state practice. 123 She even argues that the integration
of the odious debt doctrine into international law would harm third world
countries by increasing the power of IFIs over the debtor countries and
allowing the West to judge and dictate conditions to these countries. 124
She further asserts that "the international legal system should reject
the odious debt doctrine because it ultimately undermines state sovereignty
118. Okeke, supra note 72, at 1501.
119. Id. at 1502.
120. See generally A. N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR
LEURS DETTEs PUBLIQUES ET ALrRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES 157-84 (1927), available
at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/dettespubliques.html.
121. Okeke, supra note 72, at 1503 (quoting PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE
LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991)).
122. See Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 1 (Centre for Int'l Sustainable Dev.
Law, Working Paper, 2003) (defining odious debts as those "contracted against the
interests of the population of the state, without its consent, and with the full awareness of
the creditor"); see also Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each
Other, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391, 403 (2005); Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53
EMORY L.J. 923 (2004).
123. Emily F. Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the
Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1239, 1252
(2004).
124. Id. at 1256-57 (drawing a parallel between the moral assessments involved in
the odious debt doctrine and the problems entailed by high-conditionality lending).
and absolves states of liability for the actual human misery triggered by
loans to odious state regimes. ' 125 She further agues that "Western 'moral'
considerations include a fear of undermining accountability and, as a
corollary, a fear of undermining institutional stability.',
126
Mancina's arguments appear logical, though there is nothing as ugly
as orthodoxy without compassion. Of course, general international law
recognizes that internal forms of government do not affect legal rights
and responsibilities of states. As the Arbitrator in Costa Rica v. Great
Britain (Tinoco Arbitration)27 stated, "though the government changes,
the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired.' ' 128 The Arbitrator
also held in that case that "when debt transfers from a previous, recognized
regime, the debt becomes the obligation of the new government."'1 29 He
rejected the Tinoco regime's non-democratic status as grounds for
nullifying the debt, but nonetheless nullified it because "the bank knew
that this money was to be used by the retiring president, F. Tinoco for
his personal support after he had taken refuge in a foreign country.
' 13O
Mancina downplays the obvious fact that political changes may lead
to circumstances sufficient to alter particular types of treaty relations and
that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 31 allows a party to
terminate treaty obligations for various reasons, including impossibility
of performance 32 and fundamental changes in circumstances."' Changes
frustrating an agreement, apart from creating actual impossibility of
performance, may also justify termination of the contract, based on the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. As Hubert Beemelmans writes: "If a
successor State or its treaty partners think that a certain treaty is no more
adequate to changed circumstances they can renegotiate it.... The Vienna
Convention... gives all the necessary remedies. Debts can be renegotiated,
rescheduled, etc.' 34
125. Id. at 1242-43.
126. Id. at 1254.
127. Tinoco Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.Int'l Arb. Awards 375 (1923).
128. Id. at 377 (internal citation omitted); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (6th ed. 2003).
129. Tinoco Arbitration, supra note 127, at 377.
130. ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 176 (H. Lauterpacht
ed., 1933).
131. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 1,
339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
132. Id. art. 61, para. 1.
133. Id art. 62, para 1(b) (permitting termination only if "the effect of the change is
radically to transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed under the
treaty").
134. Hubert Beemelmans, State Succession in International Law: Remarks on
recent Theory and State Praxis, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 71, 123 (1997).
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With Okeke, and contrary to Mancina, the present writer emphatically
embraces the odious debt doctrine and submits that Africa's debts fall
into the class of "impossibility of performance." Much of Africa's debts
accrued during periods of military dictatorships and under the authority
of crazy men "who hear voices in the air. ' 135 Most Western countries
and IFIs knew that African dictators never intended to use these loans to
advance economic development. As Joseph Stiglitz justly argued:
When the IMF and World Bank lent money to the Democratic Republic of
Congo's notorious ruler Mobutu, they knew (or should have known) that most
of the money would not go to help that country's poor people, but rather would
be used to enrich Mobutu. It was money paid to ensure that this corrupt leader
would keep his country aligned with the West. 
136
Although the sense of injustice might be a capricious sentiment, the
present writer agrees with Stiglitz that it is unfair to call on ordinary
taxpayers in countries ruled by corrupt governments to repay loans made
to leaders who did not represent these payers.137 Transparent and accountable
governance is an integral part of sustainable development and international
cooperation, and the West increasingly asserts these values in its
dealings with developing countries. 138 It is a mockery of the human
rights rhetoric and good governance for the West to both approbate and
reprobate. Why, it may be asked, did Western creditors not take "Western
'moral' considerations" into account before advancing loans to many
corrupt governments in Africa? Why did they naYvely assume that "[a]
135. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST,
AND MONEY 383 (1964).
136. STIGLITZ, supra note 46, at 244; cf. Ann-Louise Colgan, Africa's Debt-Africa
Action Position Paper, AFR. ACTION, July, 2001, http://php.africaaction.org/action/ debtpos.htm
("Many of these loans were made to retain the loyalty of corrupt regimes, and much
of the money went into the hands of unrepresentative and repressive governments.").
137. See STIGLITZ, supra note 46, at 244.
138. See, e.g., Partnership Agreement Between the members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and
its Member States, of the other part, June 23, 2000, art. 9(1), 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3
[hereinafter Cotonou Agreement]. The agreement states that
cooperation shall be directed towards sustainable development centered on the
human person, who is the main protagonist and beneficiary of development;
this entails respect for and promotion of all human rights. Respect for all
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental
social rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and
accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development).
Id.
country does not go bankrupt ' 139 and, thus, fail to adequately assess the
risk before advancing loans?
International law does not operate in a vacuum, and, given that much
of Africa's debts will never be repaid, the most reasonable action
creditors can take is to write off the debts and save succeeding
generations of Africans from economic slavery. History shows that "the
international system tacitly accepted widespread default in the similar
economic conditions of the 1930s."' 140 The problem, as Cheryl Payer
notes, is not just a generational one: "The real problem is that those who
have to bear the heavy cost of repaying the loans with interest are not the
same people who benefited from the loans, and are not even the children
of those who benefited in most cases.",
141
The debt question is a human rights question. Human dignity is often
held as the basis of human rights. According to Jack Donnelly, "We
have human rights not to the requisites for health but to those things
'needed' for a life of dignity, for a life worthy of a human being, a life
that cannot be enjoyed without these rights."'142 In adopting the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 143 the
international community was responding to the ideal that all human
beings could be free "from fear and want."'144 The ICESCR declares that
socio-economic rights are based on the inherent dignity of all human
beings. 145 These ideals were the presuppositions, explicit and implicit,
underlying every article in the Covenant. Thus, the ICESCR guarantees
everyone the right to "an adequate standard of living.., including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions."'1 46 It guarantees "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
139. Walter Wriston, quoted in New Tricks to Learn: Survey of International Banking,
THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1993, at 1.
140. DAVID K. LEONARD & SCOTT STRAuS, AFRICA'S STALLED DEVELOPMENT:
INTERNATIONAL CURSES AND CURES 22 (2003) (arguing that the levels of debts in Africa
are not repayable).
141. CHERYL PAYER, LENT AND LOST: FOREIGN CREDIT AND THIRD WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 124 (1991); cf David 0. Friedrichs & Jessica Friedrichs, The World Bank
and Crimes of Globalization: A Case Study, 29 Soc. JUST. 13, 16 (2002) ("While Third
World political elites reaped the immediate benefits of the loan money, the largely
impoverished populations of Third World states were subsequently compelled to assume
the responsibility for repayment.").
142. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 17
(1989); see also Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our
Constitutional Order, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 193, 197-98 (2000); Alan Gewirth, Human
Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 10 (Michael J. Meyer &
William A. Parent eds., 1992).
143. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
144. Id. at pmbl.
145. Id.
146. Id art. 11, para. 1. Compare the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states,
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the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health"'147 and the
right to education, which "shall be directed to the full development of
the human personality and the sense of its dignity.
148
The ICESCR obligates each State Party "to take steps, individually
and through international assistance and co-operation... to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized [therein],' 149 a provision that has "a
dynamic relationship with all of the other provisions of the Covenant."'
150
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) states
that taking step should not be "qualified or limited by other considerations"
and that "[s]uch steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly
as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant."'1
It maintains that the phrase "to the maximum of its available resources"
is "intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources
existing within a State and those available from the international community
through international cooperation and assistance."' 5 2 The CESCR stresses,
finally, that international cooperation for development and the realization of
economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all states.153 This
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
G.A. Res. 217A(III), art. 25, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
147. ICESCR, supra note 143, art. 12, para. 1.
148. Id. art. 13, para. 1; cf UDHR, supra note 146, art. 26, para. 1-2.
149. ICESCR, supra note 143, art. 2, para. 1.
150. General Comment No. 3-The nature of State parties' obligations (art. 2,
para. 1, of the Covenant), in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 18, 1 (2001) [hereinafter
General Comment 3].
151. Id. 2.
152. Id. 13 (stressing that the essential role of international cooperation in
facilitating the full realization of socio-economic rights is further underlined by the
specific provisions in ICESCR, including articles 11, 15, 22, and 23. Article 23, in
particular, specifically identifies "the furnishing of technical assistance" and other
activities as being among the means of "international action for the achievement of the
rights recognized.").
153. Id. 14; cf G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 4, para. 2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/41/128 (Dec. 4,
1986) [hereinafter Declaration on the Right to Development] (noting, inter alia, that
sustained action is required to promote development in developing countries and calling
on states to co-operate for this purpose). On the nature of third state obligations under
the ICESCR, see MAGDALENE SEPULVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2003); Rolf
entails both negative and positive obligations-to respect, protect, promote,
and fulfill human rights. 154
The U.N. Charter also provides a normative basis for debt relief, based
on obligations of states assumed therein. The purposes of international
economic and social cooperation, as outlined in the Charter, include
promoting "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions
of economic and social progress"'155 and finding solutions to "international
economic, social, health, and related problems."' 56 Africa is part of the
international community, and if the term "international community" has
any meaning, then it surely encompasses "the one continent in which a
genuinely global political, economic, and social program merges
practical and moral considerations."' 57 Like the U.N. Charter, the UDHR
provides that everyone is entitled to a social and international order that
promotes the full realization of human rights.' 58
The notion of equal dignity and respect to all people is meaningless
unless genuine steps are taken to limit the imbalance between advantaged
and disadvantaged persons. 159 Alan Gewirth has justly argued that a
government "violates human rights when its hands-off policy lets the
most vulnerable members of its society suffer harms and injuries like
poverty, disease, illiteracy, or unemployment when it can take measures
to prevent or alleviate such ills and when the persons affected cannot ward
them off by their own efforts.' 160 A fortiori, the international community
Kunnnemann, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES 201 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004); Sigrun Skogly, The
Obligation of International Assistance and Cooperation in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE
DOWNTRODDEN: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ASBiORN EIDE 403 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2003);
Philip Alston & Gerald Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS.
Q. 186 (1987).
154. For a discussion of the typology of obligations in relation to human rights, see
African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights, in Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v.
Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, 2001-2002 AFRICAN ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT, Annex V;
see generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, Between Promise and Performance. Revisiting
States' Obligations under the African Human Rights Charter, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 105
(2004); Henry Shue, The Interdependence of Duties, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 83 (Philip
Alston & K. Tomasevski eds., 1984).
155. U.N. Charter, art. 55, para. a.
156. Id. art. 55, para. b.
157. See KISSINGER, supra note 19, at 209.
158. See UDHR, supra note 146, art. 28.
159. See Mitchell, supra note 39 ("Grossly to exploit a person's relative weakness
is not to treat her with respect; to watch her live, and often die, hungry, afraid, sick and
oppressed is precisely to deny her human dignity.").
160. ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 4 (1996).
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is complicit in the wide-scale violation of human rights when it insists
that poor states use their scarce resources to service debts.
6 1
Debt repayments exacerbate human rights violations, because they
"divert money directly from basic human needs such as health care and
education, and fundamentally undermine African governments' fight
against the AIDS pandemic and their efforts to promote sustainable
development."' 162 According to Eric Friedman, debts owed by one country
to another country or institution are resources that do not form part of
"the maximum of its available resources" that must be used to ensure the
full realization of socio-economic rights. 163 The logical but ugly implication
is that "States have a greater duty to meet their obligations with respect
to debts than they have to meet their obligations with respect to the very
lives of their people."'
' 64
A contrario, debt relief will make it possible, though by no means
certain, for African governments to channel resources into human
development objectives, to redirect resources towards raising the level of
production and services, and to create more job opportunities. It will
enable African governments to revive the failed educational systems,
acquire learning facilities, and hire new teachers. It will enable governments
to develop infrastructures, including roads and electricity, and to satisfy
the A.U. goal of generally raising the living standards of Africans. 65 It
will enable governments to establish hospitals and to open many clinics
that have been padlocked and unused across Africa, thereby fulfilling the
A.U. goal of working with relevant international partners to eradicate
preventable disease and promote good health on the continent. 66 Of
course, all of this is based on the assumption that the resources will be
well managed and not diverted into "supporting airports at villages of
presidents in Africa, or buying executive jets."'167
161. See Eric A. Friedman, Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey,
3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 191, 192 (2000).
162. Colgan, supra note 136.
163. See Friedman, supra note 161, at 198.
164. Id.
165. See Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 3, para. k, July 11, 2000, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 (as amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive
Act of the AU, July 11, 2003) available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/keyoau/
auact.pdf [hereinafter AU Act].
166. See id. art. 3, para. n.
167. Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill, Some Sensitive Issues of Deeper Debt Relief, June 1,
1999, available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/print.cfm?ContentID=2415
(quoting Callisto Madavo, World Bank Vice President for Africa).
Some commentators have argued that there is no right to food,
because it is unallocated, or lacks specific duty-bearers.'68 According to
Onora O'Neill, "it is uphill work to show that there is a universal right to
be fed.' ' 16 9 Her argument is that no one can truly claim to have a right
without specifying from whom or against whom she claims it. Revisiting
the Kantian categorical imperative, O'Neill argues that the maxim "I
will ensure that all human beings have enough to eat" does not pass the
test of universality, since no person can have an obligation to provide
food for all others. 170 The present writer disagrees with O'Neill because
the need for mutuality among all members of a society constitutes that
society's legal and moral structure. Such a structure warrants a serious
and active collaborative effort to advance the freedom and well being of
all humans as "productive agents" and to relieve extreme deprivation.' 7'
Since the desire for betterment is universal, it stands to reason that
squalor of any kind is incompatible with civilization, even if the latter is
not concerned solely with utility. 172 Degrading inequalities represent a
violation of the notion of justice as fairness-an essential element in
most theories of justice, from Plato's to John Rawls's. Each person, says
Rawls, has a right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with the
like liberty for others. Inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power
are just to the extent that they can be reasonably expected to work to the
advantage of those who are worse off.173 Indifference to gross inequalities
makes human beings mere foam on the waves of globalization and denies
the fundamental importance of human dignity. 174 Even Immanuel Kant,
whom O'Neill re-interprets, wrote that every human being should be
treated as an end, not as a means; respect for the intrinsic worth of every
person means that individuals are not to be perceived or treated merely
as instruments or objects of the will of others. 175
The problem with the postmodern view of development is that it
encourages affluent societies to avoid assisting those in poor societies
who live in absolute poverty. 176 Such indifference leaves the poor to their
168. ONORA O'NEILL, FACES OF HUNGER: AN ESSAY ON POVERTY, JUSTICE, AND
DEVELOPMENT (1986).
169. Id. at 288.
170. Id. at 101-02.
171. See GEWIRTH, supra note 160, at 4.
172. See FREUD, supra note 5, at 38-39.
173. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999) (1971)
(positing a theory of "justice as fairness." Justice, for Rawls, does not require equality in
social position; but it does require that people share one another's fate.).
174. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 119 (2d ed. 1996).
175. See IMMANUEL KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 23 (Hans Reiss ed., 1991).
176. David Simon, Development Revisited, in DEVELOPMENT AS THEORY AND PRACTICE:
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 17 (David
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own devices, and that cannot be right. The problem of poverty in any
part of the world cannot be resolved by indifference in other parts of the
world. If we believe that life has a purpose and is worth living, and that
individuals everywhere have a right to dignity, then those who are in a
position to do something about global poverty must respond not only out
of compassion but also out of a "categorical imperative."' 177 They should
work to remove the evils, structural and otherwise, that constitute violations
of human rights. Human beings are a part of the whole that we call the
universe. Our task is to free ourselves from the illusion of separateness
and widen our circle of compassion to embrace all persons of all nations. 78
Poverty may not be a new phenomenon, but it is the greatest moral
challenge of this age. 179 Africa's grinding poverty, in particular, is a
challenge to a world that aspires to build a global order.80 It is a
reminder to the international community that an increasing share of the
populace has been left behind, despite the technological successes of the
20th century and the increasing wealth in the world. It reflects an
increasing inequality in the distribution of wealth 181 and signifies the
moral bankruptcy of the current lEO.' 8 2 The international community must
respond with urgency to Africa's plight; 8 3 extreme poverty harms not
only those who suffer but also those who fail to act to reduce, if not
eliminate it. Africa's continued marginalization is a threat to global stability.
The enterprise of meeting human security and reducing or eradicating
poverty will remain a mirage for as long as African governments are
Simon & Anders Narman eds., 1999).
177. See MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HuMAN RIGHTS? 66 (1973) (arguing that
positive obligation or duty attaches to those who are able to prevent or relieve starvation
or deprivation by giving aid).
178. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 83-84 (observing that, "Africa is part
of our world community and the world must show solidarity with the people of Africa.
Common humanity and solidarity demand that we all work together to overcome
poverty, despair and death in Africa.").
179. Id. at 83 (stating that, "African poverty and stagnation is the greatest tragedy of
our time.").
180. See KISSINGER, supra note 19, at 201.
181. See Mitchell, supra note 39.
182. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Back to Basics: The ACP-EU Cotonou Trade
Agreement and Challenges for the Africa Union, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59, 110 (2004)
(hereinafter Back to Basics].
183. See Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 84 (warning that, "The risks from
delay far outweigh the risks from acting strongly and swiftly. What is required is no less
than re-casting of the relationship between Africa and the rich world, in which both, as
partners, have responsibilities to discharge in the interests of real and long-lasting
change.").
laden with the heavy yokes of debts. Of course, misrule and political
corruption has made the case for debt relief less attractive; but rich
nations must look beyond some corrupt African leaders to individuals,
who are the ultimate units of moral concern. As Chris Brown notes,
"what is crucial to a cosmopolitan attitude is the refusal to regard existing
political structures as the source of ultimate value."184
3. A Rising Hope
The struggle for debt relief has for years been like a voice crying in
the wilderness; but the G8, with its recent summits and commitments to
Africa, now seems to be responding to the cry. The campaign for debt
relief started yielding a dividend during the Cologne Summit of 1999,
when the G8 launched the enhanced HIPC initiative. This was just one
step in a long journey; 85 but it was a vital step, because it helped to
increase social expenditure in 27 (mostly African) countries by around
$4 billion per year, with 14 of these countries enjoying some debt
cancellation. 186 The G8 and the IFIs, however, should have responded
more generously. Thus, at the Okinawa Summit in 2000, the Group
invited African leaders to participate in outreach dialogue for the first
time. This dialogue culminated in the establishment of the Global Fund
for AIDS, TB and Malaria in Genoa in 2001.87 At the Genoa 2001 Summit,
the G8 also recognized the need to respond to NEPAD through the
Genoa Plan for Action and appointed Africa Personal Representatives to
recommend specific actions.188
The Kananaskis 2002 Summit launched the Africa Action Plan (AAP)
that inaugurated the new partnership between the G8 and A.U. According
to its architects, the AAP was intended to ensure that no country committed
to poverty reduction, good governance and economic reform would be
unable to achieve the MDG due to lack of finance. 189 At the Evian Summit
in 2003, the G8 announced specific measures to accelerate the AAP,
including a new G8/Africa plan to enhance African capacity to undertake
peace support operations. It also created the Africa Partnership Forum
184. CHRis BROWN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: NEW NORMATIVE APPROACHES
24 (1992).
185. See Friedman, supra note 161, at 191-92 (arguing that the 1999 debt relief
program for the HIPC was too modest and calling for an earnest debt relief plan that
should focus on eliminating debt service payments and connected to increasing social
spending and creating effective democratic institutions).
186. See, e.g., Clean Slate, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 73.
187. See Highlights of the G8 Communiqug on Africa, Annex L DIRECT GOv,
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(APF) for dialogue between Africans and development partners beyond
the G8.190 At the Sea Island Summit in 2004, the G8 agreed on further
measures to tackle the HIV and polio epidemics, enhance the role of the
private sector in development, promote transparency and fight corruption,
and to take additional steps to enhance productivity.' 91
As noted earlier, the 2005 Gleneagles Summit has also resulted in promised
debt relief to 18 heavily indebted countries. The sum involved-$40bn
or £22bn-will cost rich countries $1.2bn a year for the next three years.
This is the equivalent to an expenditure of 1.5 pence per person per week
in developed countries and represents about 5 pence per head to the
populations of the 18 beneficial countries. 192 It also represents less than
1 percent of the annual shortfall from the 0.7 percent of Gross National
Income (GNI) for development aid promised by rich countries to the
developing world. 193 This clearly shows that there is still a long way to
go in making poverty history in Africa.
Additionally, the G8 has promised to work towards establishing effective
mechanisms for asset recovery, including those stolen by corrupt leaders
and government officials, and to return such assets to their legitimate
owners. 194 The Group has also encouraged all countries to promulgate rules
denying entry and safe haven to officials and individuals found guilty of
public corruption, including those who corrupt these individuals.' 95
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See G8 Debt Relief Proposals: A First Step in the Right Direction-and a Long
Way to Go, JuniLEE RESEARCH, http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter G8 Debt Relief Proposals].
193. Id.
194. See GLENEAGLES COMMUNIQUE, supra note 10.
195. See id; cf Africa Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Afr.
Union, 2d Ord. Sess., art. 6 (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.africa-union.
org/home/Welcome.htm (follow "Official Documents" hyperlink; then follow "Treaties,
Conventions & Protocols" hyperlink). This document directs States Parties to
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as
criminal offences:
(a) The conversion, transfer or disposal of property, knowing that such
property is the proceeds of corruption or related offences for the purpose
of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping
any person who is involved in the commission of the offence to evade the
legal consequences of his or her action;
(b) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property which is the
proceeds of corruption or related offences; and
Certainly, there is a need to prevent public officials in third world countries
from laundering "dirty money" to the West. As the Blair Commission
Report succinctly summarizes:
Money and state assets stolen from the people of Africa by corrupt leaders must
be repatriated. Foreign banks must be obliged by law to inform on suspicious
accounts. Those who give bribes should be dealt with too; and foreign
companies involved in oil, minerals and other extractive industries must make
their payments much more open to public scrutiny. Firms who bribe should be
refused export credits. 196
The G8 itself has shown leadership in this area. A few years earlier,
the G8 had established, in collaboration with the President of the
European Commission, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The
FATF is charged with responsibility for developing and promoting policies
to combat money laundering and its 40 Recommendations have grown to
become the international best practices on anti-money laundering
measures. 197 A lot of work, however, remains to be done to tackle the
problem of money laundering, which continues to oxidize Africa's
ability to promote sustainable development.
At a minimum, the G8's numerous initiatives and promises indicate a
paradigm shift from the rich nations' hitherto hostile opposition to the
notion of a right to development. 198 When the U.N. adopted the Declaration
on the Right to Development (DRD) in 1986,199 the U.S. was the only
country to vote against it, arguing that the document tended to dilute and
confuse the human rights agenda.2 °° Other rich countries abstained from
voting for spurious reasons. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example,
maintained that the DRD would lead to the erosion of individual rights.2°1
Japan argued that the right-to development might be invoked to legitimize
violations of citizens' rights, while Australia maintained that the DRD
failed to draw a distinction between peoples' rights and individual rights.202
The United Kingdom (U.K.) maintained that the DRD provided an over-
(c) The acquisition, possession or use of property with the knowledge at the
time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of corruption or related
offences.
1d For a commentary, see Nsongurua J. Udombana, Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa's
Anti-corruption Convention, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 447, 467 (2003).
196. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 14.
197. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering [FATF], The Forty
Recommendations (June 20, 2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/42/
43/33628117.PDF.
198. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 60, at 141-52 (examining, inter alia, the politicization
of the right to development discourse in the U.N.).
199. See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 153.
200. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Third World and the Right to Development:
Agenda for the Next Millennium, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 753, 766 nn.84-85 (2000).
201. See id. at 766 n.84.
202. See id.
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simplified view of the complex relationship between disarmament,
security and development, and that it provided a mistaken link between
the promotion of human right and the establishment of a NIEO.2 °3
The current paradigm shift signals that rich nations now recognize
what Rhoda Howard calls "the legitimate rights claims of poor nations.
2 ° 4
The present writer hopes that the G8 will make good on its promise, so
that Africa can channel resources towards fighting the crushing and
humiliating poverty of its people. The rising economic status of Africans will
embolden governments to undertake complementary internal political and
economic reforms for sustainable growth. Conversely, increasing poverty and
decreasing incomes undermine support for reforms.2 °5 Lastly, the G8 must
revisit the debt question regularly, realizing that the struggle to liberate
mankind from poverty will be difficult and long. According to the U.N.
Millennium Project,20 6 "[a]ggregate debt service payments will need to be
reduced by an estimated $7 billion in 2006, falling to $1 billion by 2015,
to ensure that all countries can finance MDG investments." 207 This means
that with regard to the debt question, the last card has not yet been played.
4. Debt Relief and Conditionality
Some have argued that debt relief should be conditional, since it has
the potential to foster imprudent future policies. Conditionality will ensure
the economic transparency, accountability and sound macro-economic
policies that could lead the economies of debtor nations towards sustainable
development. Thus, the G8 could link debt relief to effective domestic
policies, legal reforms, and tackling of corruption. Countries that have
embarked on such reforms should be encouraged to continue to do so.
Ordinarily, he who pays the piper has the right to dictate the tune of the
music. Similarly, rich countries have a right to monitor the economic policies
of poor but debt free countries to prevent them from plunging into future debts.
The real question is how far conditionality can go before debt relief
begins to meddle in the domestic affairs of foreign states and inflicts
203. See id.
204. Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights, Development and Foreign Policy, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL VIEWS 215, 215 (1989).
205. See STIGLITZ, supra note 46, at 167.
206. U.N. Dev. Programme [UNDP], U.N. Millennium Project, Investing in
Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (2005),
available at http://www.unmilleniumproject.org/documents/MainReportComplete-lowres.pdf
[hereinafter Investing in Development].
207. Id. at 297.
another form of servitude. Larry Diamond has argued that debt relief
should be matched with high-conditionality for more-accountable
government practices.20 8 However, high-conditionality has its downside.
As the present writer has noted elsewhere, "[t]he increasing tendency to
impose conditionalities of a political nature for development assistance
to Africa has had unintended but negative consequences. 2 °9 Conditioning
new loans on borrowing countries' credit-worthiness has proven to be
impractical in the past, especially when the countries applying for these
loans already face debt crises. In addition, problems involving debt
overhang preclude any success in high-conditionality lending.210
A movement is already underway to dilute the recent promised debt
relief. Willy Kiekens, the Belgian representative on the IMF's executive
board, has proposed that the IMF have the right to approve key economic
policies in the 18 countries to which it offered debt relief.211 There are also
indications that the U.S. and U.K. plan to allow multinational corporations
to manage relief offered by them.2 12 The G8 must avoid creating a
relationship of dependence with recipient states. If the IMF or multinational
corporations become the handmaidens of creditors, the West's priorities
will be imposed on a people who have more urgent concerns. Often,
what the IFIs mean by reforms is nothing but measures that will ensure
and secure free markets, free trade, and free access to Third World
natural resources. Debt relief with "high-conditionality" could make a
terrible situation worse; it could, in the words of Colgan, be "another means
by which rich country creditors retain control of African economies, and
it is an inappropriate intervention in the process by which these countries
govern themselves." 213 Many of Africa's economic woes originate in the
activities of the IFIs and multinational corporations. As George Monbiot
argues: "The history of corporate involvement in Africa is one of forced
208. See Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy in Africa: African and International
Imperatives, 14 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 191 (2001). Jeffrey Sachs defines "high-
conditionality," in relation to lending, as "the process in which international institutions
make loans based on the promise of the borrowing countries to pursue a specified set of
policies." Jeffrey Sachs, Conditionality, Debt Relief and the Developing Country Debt
Crisis, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 275 (Jeffrey Sachs,
ed., 1989) [hereinafter Sachs, Conditionality & Debt Reliej).
209. Back to Basics, supra note 182, at 100 (arguing that the provision in the ACP-
EU Cotonou Agreement that allows for the use of resources for debt relief initiatives
should not be obstructed by unnecessary political conditionalities).
210. See Sachs, Conditionality & Debt Relief supra note 208, at 275-77.
211. See Nicholas Watt, Move to Dilute G8 Debt Deal, GUARDIAN WKLY. [U.K.],
July 22-28, 2005, at 4.
212. See George Monbiot, Africa's New Best Friends, GUARDIAN WKLY. [U.K.],
July 15-21, 2005, at 13 (fearing that multinational corporations will become the primary
instruments of G8 policies in Africa and arguing that investment by many of these
multinationals has not enriched Africa and its people but impoverished them).
213. Colgan, supra note 136.
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labour, evictions, murders, wars, the under-cutting of resources, tax
evasion and collusion with dictators. ' 14
While donor nations have the right to monitor the expenditure of
money they give to poor nations, it is more important that donor nations
assist Africa in developing and using its resources, with "an effective
implementation of the sense of personal responsibility."2 15 African states,
for their part, must not see debt relief as a means to access more free
foreign funds. These newly debt-free countries could be tempted to borrow
rashly, and some private-sector lenders might foolishly lend to countries
with dismal credit histories, 216 thereby leading governments to abdicate
their primary responsibilities for sustainable economic development.
2 17
It will be tragic for Africa to mistake this particular remedy of debt relief
as the elixir of life.
III. BEYOND DEBT RELIEF
The cancellation of all of Africa's debt will not resolve its development
crisis for the simple reason that Africa's problems go beyond debt relief.
As the MDG Report 2005 points out, "[d]ebt relief, while welcome,
often goes to countries that have ceased debt repayments, and does not
necessarily provide new finance for social services or poverty reduction.
' 2 18
Aid and trade top the current development discourse, but aid is not the
real solution-from an external vantage point. Since the best way to
solve a problem is to remove its cause rather than treat its effects, the
present writer believes that open access to international trade is the most
potentially beneficial measure for Africa.2 19 The first segment examines
the aid question; the second examines the trade question.
214. Monbiot, supra note 212, at 13.
215. GEWIRTH, supra note 160, at 58; cf. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 86
("Better governance must be at the heart of the African resurgence and it must be
managed by Africans").
216. See Clean Slate, supra note 186, at 74.
217. See Jerry Rawlings, Africa Needs People Power, THE GUARDIAN [U.K.], July
14, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/hearafrica05/ (scroll down to comment
section) (arguing that no funds are coming from external sources and that debt relief is
merely the removal of debtors' obligations to transfer financial resources to creditors).
218. MDG REPORT 2005, supra note 29, at 37.
219. Cf G8 Debt Relief Proposals, supra note 192 ("Until a fundamental reform of
international finance and trade is undertaken, debt cancellation-though necessary in the
short term-can only address the symptoms and not the cause of chronic poverty in the
developing world.").
A. Examining the Aid Question
Orthodox approaches to development emphasize aid, loans, and other
forms of resource transfers. Development haulers believe that breathing
more aid air into Africa's paralytic lungs will resuscitate and prolong its
economic growth. Is aid the answer or part of the problem? This segment
argues that aid is merely a powerful distraction that allows Africans to
make light of their miseries.
1. Reviving Aid
Africa has received historically unprecedented amounts of foreign aid
from the North. In the 1960s, when central planning was in fashion, the
West poured money into massive irrigation and industrialization projects
in Africa. These avant-garde approaches soon unraveled and sustainable
development became the next big idea. When sustainability failed, experts
advocated community participation in planning. Nicolas Van De Walle
also notes that Africa's relationship with the international economy in
the early 1990s was almost entirely mediated by resource transfers, due
to the decline in the continent's share of international trade and foreign
direct investment.220 Statistics have shown that aid to Africa in the 1990s
221reached an average of $35 per capita, reaching "staggering levels" in some
countries.222
There is renewed focus on aid as a panacea to speed Africa's
development. At its 2005 Abuja Summit, the A.U. Assembly called on
the G8 to transfer resources to Africa.223 Tony Blair hinged his G8 and
European Union (E.U.) Presidencies on an African recharge agenda that
will make an additional $25 billion in aid available to a continent he
once described as "a scar on the conscience of the world., 224 The Blair
Commission Report has also brought the issue of aid to the forefront of
global politics. The Report reflects its authors' belief that Africa is stuck
in a "poverty trap" from which it cannot escape without a so-called "big
220. See NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE POLITICS OF
PERMANENT CRISIS, 1979-1999, at 189 (2001) (discussing the crisis of foreign aid in
Africa).
221. See chapter 1, in AID AND REFORM IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM TEN CASE
STuDIES (Shantayanan Devarajan, David Dollar & Torgny Holmgren eds., 2000).
222. LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 140, at 11 (noting that "for five African states,
aid represented at least one-fifth of gross national product at some point in the 1990s,
and in one year it stood at 42 percent for Mozambique").
223. Decision on NEPAD, supra note 117, 3.
224. Ewen MacAskill, Blair Scorns the Cynics-Out of Africa PM Attempts to Set
New Partnership Agenda for West, THE GUARDIAN [U.K.], Feb. 8, 2002, at 1 (quoting
Tony Blair).
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push." "The big-push approach," according to the Report, "is the only one
that can address Africa's challenges with the urgency and effectiveness
required.,
225
The Blair Commission Report states that successful development is
unlikely in Africa "[w]ithout simultaneous and effective action on several
priority fronts. 226 It argues that aid has, so far, been dribbled out in
small measures, in a manner analogous to sending a single fire-fighter to
save an entire block of flats engulfed in flames. To douse the flames of
debt, the Report recommends a package of dramatically larger aid flows,
complete debt relief, improved governance, and fundamental changes to
the rules of aid and trade. It calls for an extra $25 billion a year in aid to
Africa by 2010, another $25 billion a year by 2015 and recommends
"'aid for trade' to help meet the economic and social costs of adjusting
to a new global trading environment. 227
In January 2005, the U.N. unveiled the Report of its Millennium
Project, which states that "tropical Africa, even in well governed parts, is
stuck in a poverty trap-too poor to achieve robust and high levels of
economic growth, and in many places simply too poor to grow at all.9228
The continent, according to the Report, is uniquely burdened with disease,
accounting for 85 percent of malaria's global annual death toll of 1.2
million and 75 percent of the 3.1 million deaths from AIDS in 2004.229
Africa is also geographically disadvantaged, as less than a quarter of
Sub-Saharan Africans live within 100 km of the coast, so that the
continent can attract and amass too little capital to support a growing
population. Africa's gross national savings in 2003 was a mere 16 percent
of GDP, compared to East Asia's 42 percent.230 Without sufficient savings,
the Report notes, Africa cannot overcome its shortage of capital.
Africa's unique circumstances require a "big push," that is, a
"[s]ubstantial co-financing" through Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA), in order "to scale up the needed investments in infrastructure,
human capital, and public administration., 231 The Millennium Report
225. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 87.
226. Id. at 85.
227. Id. at 247.
228. Investing in Development, supra note 206, at 148.
229. See id at 150.
230. See id. at 37.
231. Id. at 204 (noting that even a significant increase in domestic resource
mobilization will not be enough to enable well governed countries caught in a poverty
trap to achieve the MDG).
calls for fast-tracking "well-governed poverty trap countries" in 2005, by
basing aid on a true MDG-needs assessment and ensuring that such aid
"is not the binding constraint to scaling up.
232
2. The Problem with Aid
The first problem with the new aid initiatives is that they have not
convincingly established the correlation between aid and economic
growth. Aid has never been a solution to Africa's development plight.233
The reason is simple: Providing aid is like scratching an unremitting
itch, which brings little respite but leaves lasting scars. Even if aid were
the sure route to sustainable development in Africa, a contention this
author refutes, 234 Africa has not been so lucky with ODA, the technical
name for aid. Overall, aid has been a double-edged sword, "initially
helping but eventually weakening a country's economic performance.,
235
Aid initially ensured "a relatively peaceful transfer of power to
independent governments at the end of colonialism and oversaw their
,236
entrance into the international community of states." However, aid
eventually became positively inimical to economic growth in Africa,
because much of the aid project was poorly targeted and managed, and
the North often attached political and commercial strings to such
grants.237 Besides strengthening the hand of predatory governments
against claims from competing constituencies, 238 aid has sustained old
policies, slowed reform and exacerbated neo-patrimonial tendencies in
decision-making.239
Aid has led to the establishment of parallel systems of procurement
and recruitment for expending project funds in Africa, thereby posing
substantial burdens on already weak local managerial systems. In Tanzania,
for example, donors were reportedly implementing more than 15 stand-
232. Id.
233. See generally Carol Lancaster, Aid Effectiveness in Africa: The Unfinished
Agenda, 8 J. AFR. ECON. 487 (1999) (calling for honest debates on the effectiveness of aid
in Africa); JAMES MORTON, THE POVERTY OF NATIONS: THE AID DILEMMA AT THE HEART
OF AFRICA (1994).
234. Nsongurua J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the
New Partnership for Africa's Development, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 293, 325 (2002) (arguing
that aid, at best, "is like a birthday card: it is only a greeting, not the real gift").
235. ERA 2003, supra note 84, at 7.
236. DE WALLE, supra note 220, at 189.
237. See Back to Basics, supra note 182, at 100 (arguing: "The increasing tendency
to impose conditionalities of a political nature for development assistance to Africa has
had unintended but negative consequences.").
238. See, e.g., Claude Ake, Rethinking African Democracy, in THE GLOBAL
RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 70 (Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner eds., 1993).
239. See DE WALLE, supra note 220, at 190.
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alone projects in the health sector in the early 1990S,240 and in Malawi,
there were 44 distinct projects in the agricultural sector.24 1 The U.S. used
aid during the Cold War as a political strategy; bringing "progress" to
the Third World was necessary to prevent "communist subversion.
242
Such a strategy explained why the U.S. wasted resources in propping up
economically illiterate kleptocrats like Mobutu Sese Seko of then Zaire
(now the Democratic Republic of Congo),243 a practice Yoweri Museveni
calls "a life-support system for brain-dead regimes." 2"
The aid regime was particularly punitive during the era of the
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s, arguably because
both SAPs and aid were based on asymmetrical power relationships
rather than partnerships. The Bretton Woods sisters-the World Bank
and IMF-forced SAPs on African states, compelling them to liberalize
their trade sector, eliminate distortions in prices, devalue their currencies,
remove government subsidies, reduce the budget deficit and size of the
public sector, and privatize government parastatals.245 SAPs made the
implementation of such policies a pre-condition for debt re-scheduling,
new loan facilities, and other concessions. These interventions were
rationalized on the ideological but illogical grounds of economic neo-
liberalism.
246
SAPs provided only a partial solution to Africa's economic problems,
promoting reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions, but
devoting inadequate attention to social services. They failed to take into
240. See MBOYA BAGACHWA ET AL., A STUDY OF DANISH AID EFFECTIVENESS IN
TANZANIA (1996).
241. ELLIOT J. BERG, RETHINKING TECHNICAL COOPERATION 132 (1993); see also
DE WALLE, supra note 220, at 203 n.32.
242. See Pierre de Senarclens, How the United Nations Promotes Development
Through Technical Assistance, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER 190 (Majid Rahnema &
Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997) (noting that just as the Marshall Plan was to contain the
communist threat in Europe, economic aid became part of American political strategy
during the Cold War.).
243. See James Gathii, A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of
Africa's Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development,
13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 192 (2003) (arguing, "increased flows of
capital and aid to Africa have acted as perverse incentives supporting regimes and
economic policies that did not contribute either to growth or poverty reduction").
244. Quoted in Douglas Rimmer, Book Review, 98 AFR. AFF. 589, 590 (1999)
(reviewing CAROL LANCASTER, AID TO AFRICA: SO MUCH TO DO, So LITTLE DONE
(1999)).
245. See LIMITS OF ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION,
1986-94, at ix, 7 (Poul Engberg-Pedersen et al. eds., 1996).
246. RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 1 (1999).
consideration the specific needs of individual countries, thereby prescribing
one medication for different ailments. "As a consequence," says NEPAD,
"only a few countries managed to achieve sustainable higher growth
under these programs. 247 SAPs reinforced authoritarianism in Africa, as
most governments were intolerant of opposition to adjustment measures.
Even Ghana, the World Bank's showpiece of adjustment in Africa,
repressed the demands of significant sections of civil societies.248 SAPs
failed because privatization without the necessary institutional infrastructure
leads to asset stripping rather than wealth creation, and privatizing
monopolies without regulation leads to consumer exploitation.249
The economically obstructive policies of African governments have
generally undermined the effectiveness of aid. Aid works where sound
institutions and effective governments manage it. Good governance has
been, and continues to be, a scarce commodity in Africa. If good governance
means "the responsible use of political authority to manage a nation's
affairs, 250 then the U.N. Millennium Report is wrong when it flatters
Africa, stating that "many parts of Africa are well governed., 251 The
NEPAD itself implicitly acknowledges that governance is still a problem
in Africa:
The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required
to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance [in
Africa], and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources
and to use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely
committed to a sustained human development effort and poverty eradication. 252
If the yardsticks for measuring good governance are effective leadership,
technical policy competence, and administrative efficiency,253 then only
very few African governments, probably Botswana's, Ghana's, Senegal's,
and South Africa's, pass the test-few good apples amid a barrel of bad ones.
Besides the visible examples of "profoundly poor governance" that the
Millennium Report cites, including Zimbabwe, Angola, Liberia, Sierra
247. NEPAD, supra note 13, $ 24.
248. See generally P. THANDiKA MKANDAWIRE & ADEBAYO OLUKOSHI, BETWEEN
LIBERALISATION AND OPPRESSION: THE POLITICS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA
226 (1995).
249. See STIGLITZ, supra note 46, at 220 (arguing, "privatisation accompanied by
regulation, corporate restructuring, and strong corporate governance has led to higher
growth.").
250. CLARENCE J. DIAS & DAVID GILLIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, &
DEVELOPMENT 4 (1993).
251. Investing in Development, supra note 206, at 146 ("there is no evidence that
Africa's governance, on average, is worse than elsewhere once we control for Africa's
very low income.").
252. NEPAD, supra note 13, $ 6 (italics supplied).
253. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in
Africa, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1209, 1231 (2003).
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Leone, Sudan, and the misleadingly renamed Democratic Republic
(DR) of Congo, 54 bad governance and mismanagement of public
resources still afflict more than a dozen other African states. Most
governments, past and present, have invested huge sums of public
revenue into white elephant projects that undermine their ability to fulfill
their primary responsibilities to their people. For example, Felix Houphoudt-
Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire not only moved his country's capital to his
hometown of Yamoussoukro but also built the world's largest church
there in 1989-the Basilica of Our Lady of Peace. A few years after his
death, peace has eluded this country that was once the bastion of
stability in SSA
Some governments, like Nigeria's, have spent staggering sums of
money building stadiums and thereafter lobbying to host international
sporting events--Olympics, World Cup, etcetera-in a continent where
most workers are forced to strike before receiving their monthly salaries,
and where pensioners are habitually forgotten. Although Nigeria's President
Obasanjo is seemingly fighting corruption2 55 and preaching rectitude
and accountability by public office holders, his sermons and his actions
are incongruous. The Nigerian leader frequently seeks legislative approval
to add new jets to his presidential fleet. 256 Yet, in Nigeria, the minimum
wage for civil servants is N5,500 (less than $50) per month;257 facilities
needed for qualitative basic education are almost non-existent; and "per
capita spending on health is shockingly $3. ' 2S8 Such contradictions explain
why critics are not convinced about the sincerity of his "war on
254. Id.
255. In June 2000, the Obasanjo Government enacted legislation that prescribes
punishment for and prohibits corrupt practices and other related offenses. The Corrupt
Practices and Other Related Offences Act, (2000) Cap. 5, §§ 8-26 (Nigeria) [hereinafter
Corrupt Practices Act], available at http://www.nigeria-law.org.LFNMainPage.htm. For
commentary, see Paul D. Ocheje, Law and Social Change: A Socio-Legal Analysis of
Nigeria's Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, 45 J. AFR. L. 173
(2001).
256. See, e.g., D. S. Dauda, Misplaced Priorities and Claptrap Policies, AMANA
ONLINE, June 25, 2003, http://www.amanaonline.com/Articles/art 391.htm (writing on
the squandering of Nigeria's resources on wasteful and diversionary projects, like
procurement of presidential jets).
257. See National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act No. 1 (2000), § 2 (Nigeria),
available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/LFN-2000.htm (providing, "as from the commencement
of this Act, it shall be the duty of every employer (except as provided for under this Act)
to pay a wage not less than National Minimum Wage of N5,500.00 per month to every
worker under his establishment").
258. Okeke, supra note 72, at 1496 n.51 (noting also that "[o]nly 38% of children
are immunized against measles").
corruption, 2 59 since the preacher gains few proselytes through teachings
that his own behavior contradicts.
3. Making Marginal Gains from Aid
Aid can arguably promote good governance, "since good governance
requires resources for wages, training, information systems," etcetera.26 °
Assuming, arguendo, that aid can help resolve Africa's development
crisis, how may its beneficial impacts be realized? The answer lies in
ensuring that future resources go directly to beneficiaries rather than
through official bureaucracies that engender corruption. Donors should
channel their monies directly to HIV/AIDS prevention and combating
malaria and other deadly diseases by opening and funding independent
research centers in Africa for these and related projects. They should
work through relevant U.N. or A.U. agencies to procure laboratory,
scientific and technological equipment, and provide these directly to African
universities to enhance research. They should identify farmers' cooperative
societies and provide direct assistance in procuring fertilizers. They should
locate credible civil society institutions, like the media, and strengthen them
through training and the provision of modem equipment. These measures,
in turn, will strengthen good governance in Africa.
B. Examining the Trade Question
Trade is arguably the engine of economic growth. If the G8 is serious
about integrating Africa into the international economic system, it should
remove trade barriers and open its markets to African goods. Changes in
the rule structure of international trade would help Africa more than all
the aid provided by the North.261 This segment explicates why trade
matters to Africa, and how the continent can be integrated into the global
trading system to achieve an equitable IEO.
259. See Peter Ezeh, War on Corruption Yet to Convince, NEW AFRICAN, July 2005,
at 28 (reporting that, six years into his presidency, Obasanjo's war on corruption has
been met with a degree of uncertainty in some quarters).
260. Cf Investing in Development, supra note 206, at 146 ("Controlling for income
is necessary in evaluating governance since good governance requires resources for
wages, training, information systems, and so forth, and thus improves systematically
with income levels.").
261. See Udombana, How Should We Then Live?, supra note 234, at 326 (arguing
that if the industrial countries should open up their markets, "then African countries
could increase their exports and earn much more income than what has been coming to
them by way of aid").
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1. Why Trade Matters to Africa
Trade matters to Africa because the continent is presently the weakest
member of the world trading community.262 Improved trade performance
means access to new markets, increased competition, and productivity,
all of which will accelerate growth in per capita income and reduce
poverty. Improved access to industrial countries' markets for products
in which Africa has a comparative advantage will "[o]pen, predictable




Even before the Uruguay Round, Africa had raised the "market access
conditions for products of interest to African countries and the inadequate
treatment of the development dimension in the new areas of trade related
aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), trade related investment
measures (TRIMS) and trade in Services." 26
Nothing has changed for the better in Africa since the Uruguay Round
concluded in 1994. Lopsided implementation by the WTO continues to
undermine Africa's contribution to global trade, causing real-life devastation
and a growing social and political backlash.265 As Lori Wallach and Patrick
Woodall put it: "In the era of the WTO, and corporate-led globalization, the
world has been buffeted by unprecedented financial crises which have
shattered the lives of millions and unraveled decades of development.. ,,266
Africa's report card on global trade has been dismal: "Africa in 20 years,"
says the Blair Commission Report, "saw its share in world trade fall from
six to two percent; just one percentage point of that fall represents more than
$70 billion in foregone revenues annually. 2 67
In his forward to the Economic Report on Africa 2004, the Executive
Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) lamented:
262. Declaration on Uruguay Round, supra note 76, 9.
263. NEPAD, supra note 13, 170.
264. Declaration on Uruguay Round, supra note 76, 4.
265. See generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Question of Justice: The WTO, Africa,
and Countermeasures for Breaches of International Trade Obligations, 38 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) (exploring some of the legal and developmental issues
arising from the WTO trade regime, particularly as they affect Africa, and urging Africa
to adopt unilateral measures to counterpoise breaches of international trade rules and
strengthen its domestic economy and bargaining power in global trade negotiations,
particularly as WTO remedies offer little prospects of effectiveness). For a defense
of the liberal trade regime, see BRIAN MCDONALD, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND (1998).
266. See WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 41, at 283-84.
267. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 87.
Trade is one of the main drivers of growth and development; yet Africa's trade
performance is weak. The region's share in world merchandise exports fell
from 6.3% in 1980 to 2.5% in 2000 in value terms. It recorded a meager 1.1%
average annual growth over the 1980-2000 period, compared to 5.9% in Latin
America and 7.1% in Asia. Further, while about 70% of developing countries'
exports are manufactures, Africa has hardly benefited from the boom in these
exports. Overall on the continent, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa,
progress on export diversification has been slow.268
African farmers have been squeezed to the point of starvation as global
grain traders use WTO rules to manipulate markets and dump 269 goods in
the continent. Tariff walls and finicky rules-of-origin and health-and-safety
standards continue to obstruct Africa's efforts to participate meaningfully
in the trading system. In 2001 alone, Mali lost $43 million as a result of
large subsidies to U.S. and E.U. producers, which lowered the price of
cotton--one of Mali's main exports.27°
Such unceasing unfair trade practices led the A.U. Assembly at its
2005 Abuja Summit to call on the G8 to complete the Doha Round of
trade negotiations as early as possible.271 The Doha Round, which fell
apart in September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico,272 was expected to provide
Africa with free, non-reciprocal access to industrial countries' markets
and eliminate export subsidies for agricultural products.273 Africa is partially
justified in its expectation that the conclusion of the Doha Round will
boost its sustainable development. Millennium Project participants also
believe that a successful conclusion of the Doha Round will increase
Africa's access to rich world markets and bring benefits to middle-
274income countries.
The problem is that the G8 does not think Africa is benefiting its
members by opening up its economy; and one who does not think he
receives a favor from another is unlikely to acknowledge or repay it. This
probably explains why fair trade did not feature prominently at the G8
Gleneagles Summit; their communiqud was weak on subsidies-comforting
words, but little real agreement or commitment to substantial action.
Given the rat race that underpins world trade, it is unlikely that market
access will soon become a reality, either through G8 summits, or
through talks at the tranquil shores of Lake Geneva.
268. K.Y. Amoako, Foreword to ERA 2004, supra note 32, at xi.
269. Dumping is the selling of products below cost.
270. ERA 2004, supra note 32, at 5.
271. Decision on NEPAD, supra note 117, 3.
272. See generally FATOUMATA JAWARA & AILEEN KwA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT
THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LESSONS
OF CANCUN (2004) (for an analysis of the multilateral politics and North-South relations
as played out in the WTO).
273. See generally Global Economic Prospects 2004, supra note 35.
274. Investing in Development, supra note 206, at 204.
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2. Towards a More Credible Multilateral Trading System
The G8 carries the greatest responsibility to promote "the fuller integration
of developing countries into the global trading system., 275 It must take
trade with Africa seriously if it is sincere about meeting the continent's
development challenge. As President George W. Bush justly puts it,
"Developed nations have a duty not only to share [their] wealth, but also
to encourage sources that produce wealth: economic freedom, political
liberty, the rule of law and human rights., 276 Development and economic
freedom are the most important issues facing SSA at the moment.277
Africa needs help kick-starting development and the freedom and
opportunity to create wealth and end poverty.
As a starting point, the G8 should provide free trade status for Africa
in the global market, which means "giving African countries the
opportunity not only to sell agricultural products in rich-country and
world markets on fair terms, but also to diversify beyond traditional
exports into new exports of manufactures and services. 278 Industrial
countries should tear down trade walls that keep African goods out of
these countries' markets. They should end agricultural subsidies that
"distort and depress the global commodity markets upon which African
economies are dependent., 279 As the ECA also advised:
275. Cf id. at 197 (quoting Rodrigo de Ratoy Figadero, IMF Managing Director);
cf Declaration on the Socio-Economic Situation in Africa, supra note 68, 13
(announcing: "The developed countries bear a major responsibility for the transformation
of the present inequitable international system.").
276. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the International Conference on
Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico (Mar. 22, 2002), http://www.un.org/
ffd/statements/usaE.htm.
277. See Deconstructing Development, supra note 53, at 2-3 ("For the Third World,
however, development is the most important concept in the international system, for it is
development that defines and locates the Third World within the international
community.").
278. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 87.
279. Gathii, supra note 243, at 181 (noting that such practices are "inconsistent with
the capitalist vision of market-centered development that industrialized countries and the
multilateral economic institutions they control require African economies to adopt."); cf
MDG REPORT 2005, supra note 29, at 38 ("If developing countries are to realize the
potential of international trade to enhance economic growth, the main barriers to their
exports need to be removed. These include tariffs (taxes) imposed by developed
countries on imports from developing countries and the subsidies that developed
countries provide to domestic agricultural producers.").
The industrialized countries must commit themselves to the development
principles of the WTO's Doha Round, by widening market access for
developing country exports and providing more trade-related assistance to
poor countries. Such assistance is necessary, both to bear the heavy costs
associated with trade liberalization and to help countries exploit the
opportunities arising from a more integrated global economy. 280
International economic cooperation must be "based on mutual interest,
shared commitments and binding agreements, 28' and should aim to
promote sustainable development, contribute to poverty eradication and
facilitate the smooth integration of African countries into the global
economy. The revived Doha Round must be sensitive to Africa's
development policy objectives, including questions of technology
transfer and national capacity building in all sectors critical to Africa's
development process. The credibility of the multilateral trading system
rests upon the reduction of trade barriers and the integration of
marginalized nations into the international trading system.282
The international community must find acceptable common ground
for working with Africa to secure a level playing field in global trade and
achieving development-friendly rules. The rightto development demands a
form of globalization that is both ethical and sympathetic. 283 As Mohammed
Bedjaoui correctly argues, "the international dimension of the right to
development is nothing more than an equitable distribution with regard
to global social and economic well being."284 Human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law thrive only in an economically empowered society. Weak
economic societies are unlikely to become strong democratic societies.285
280. ERA 2004, supra note 32, at 1.
281. NEPAD, supra note 13, 205; cf Algiers Declaration, supra note 13, at 8
(calling for "a mutually beneficial and genuine international partnership; a partnership
based on a balance of interests and mutual respect...").
282. Declaration on Uruguay Round, supra note 76, 8 (stressing that the durability
of the multilateral trading system depends on its ability to provide benefits to all its
partners).
283. Flavia Piovesan, Social, Economic and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political
Rights, 1 SUR INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 21, 27 (2004), available at http://www.surjournal.org/
index.php?ed=l.
284. Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right to Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ACHIEVEmENTS AND PROSPECTS 1182 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
285. See Udombana, The Third World and the Right to Development, supra note
200, at 785 ("The West must recognize that underdeveloped societies are not likely to
become democratic. Democracy will not thrive in instability. The West cannot
simultaneously demand democracy and deny development. It cannot expect people to
cherish the ballots when their stomachs are empty.").
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IV. REINVIGORATING AFRICA'S REGULATORY AND ECONOMIC
POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
It is naive to assume that all of Africa's failures and asymmetries are
externally induced. Most countries in Africa have not positively
exploited the political and economic goodwill that have beckoned at
their sovereign doorsteps over the years. The reasons for these failures
include Africa's economically obstructive policies; African states have
not always adopted the right policy mix and strategies for sustainable
economic development. Political and economic failures have, according to
NEPAD, "impede[d] the effective mobilisation and utilisation of scarce
resources into productive areas of activity in order to attract and
facilitate domestic and foreign investment. '286 The result, says the A.U.
Commission, is that, "[a]t this dawn of the 21 st Century, Africa portrays
the image of a Continent that has taken very little advantage of the
economic globalisation which has been gathering pace since the 80s and
is evidenced by tremendous wealth creation.
2 87
For Africa to stay afloat in the ocean of corporate-led globalization, it
must reinvigorate its regulatory and economic policies. As the A.U.
Commission again hints: "It has therefore become increasingly and
absolutely necessary to undertake major changes by addressing the root
causes of the structural deficiencies in Africa's economies, if we are to
promote endogenous development."
288
A. Renovating Weak Political and Institutional Structures
The renovation of African economies must start with political
transformation, which requires building an effective state that can create
an environment that allows economic activity and entrepreneurship to
flourish.289 Weak post-colonial structures and institutions continue to pull
Africa backward with "shoestring" budgets, compromises, and external
sources of power. Many African states possess juridical statehood without
286. NEPAD, supra note 13, 34; cf Declaration on the Establishment within the
OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Org. Afr.
Unity, 29th Ord. Sess., 8, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX) (June 28-30, 1993)
(admitting: "We do recognize, however, that there have also been certain internal human
factors and policies which have negatively contributed to the present state of affairs on
the Continent.").
287. Our Common Destiny, supra note 16, at 7 (emphasis added).
288. Id. at 8.
289. See Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 87.
the empirical attributes, like control over the legitimate exercise of
coercion within boundaries, financial self-sufficiency, leadership of national
political communities, and provision of basic services. Neo-colonialism
continues to pose a problem for Africa, as many of these states,
especially Francophone ones, remain tied to the apron strings of their
former colonial overlords.
The typical post-colonial state evolved as a synthesis between the
thesis of colonialism and the anti-thesis of nationalism, producing what
Basil Davidson calls a "nation-statism [that] looked like a liberation. '" 291
Colonialism was "the cradle of contemporary forms of fragmentation in
Africa," though, as Obiora Okafor pointedly observes, the colonial state
weaved the "forms of fragmentation from the material that the pre-
existing, pre-colonial sets of identities and relationships" provided.292
Nonetheless, the transfer of power to African rulers did not change the
basis of statehood, which continues to derive primarily from the international
system-bilateral Western donors and international organizations-with
domestic sources of statehood remaining secondary.29 3
Weak states have allowed dictatorship to thrive in Africa in the past.
Raw assertions of personal power become a form of legitimacy where
the institutional concept of legitimacy is absent.2 94 Even presently, the
monster of dictatorship is rearing its head again in some parts of Africa.
On August 1, 2005, some "semi-illiterate soldiers," led by one Mr. Vall,
staged a coup in Mauritania-one of the projected beneficiaries of the
G8 debt relief--ousting Maaouya Ould Taya.295 Taya himself was a
despot who came to power as a result of a coup in 1984. Like most
other so-called modem "democrats," (Togo's Eyadema, Sudan's El-Bashir,
Libya's Gaddafi, Gambia's Jammeh, and Uganda's Museveni are just a
few of the "new political leaders" in Africa 296) Taya seized power under
the guise of saving his country, only to subsequently conduct sham
290. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD 21 (1990) (arguing that African states were "not
authorized and empowered domestically"); see also Robert H. Jackson & Carl G.
Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist." The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, 35
WORLDPOL. 1 (1982).
291. DAVIDSON, supra note 63, at 10.
292. OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, RE-DEFINING LEGITIMATE STATEHOOD: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND STATE FRAGMENTATION IN AFRICA 98 (2000).
293. LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 140, at 10-11.
294. See KISSINGER, supra note 19, at 204.
295. See Mauritania: Army Says Has Seized Power to End Totalitarian Days, U.N.
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Aug. 3, 2005, http://www.allafiica.com/stories/
200508030836.html (subscription service required).
296. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 84 (asserting that, "Democracy has
spread in Africa and the continent has new political leaders...").
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elections and stay on to become ever more corrupt and ruthless.297 Most
African rulers bathe in the same ambience of power: they came to power
through treachery and cruelty and continue to exploit the noble motions
of their victims for purely selfish ends. Of all tyrannies, that which is
purportedly exercised for the good of its victims may be the most
oppressive.
Africa persists in intoning the mantra of democracy, but its practice of
this concept is alien to rational thought. Most of Africa's governments
continue to work against all known democratic principles, including the
rule law, which is democracy's lifeblood. Hardly anyone, except the
political class, can speak confidently about the integrity of the electoral
process in most of Africa. The A.U. itself is largely a cheerleader and, despite
its numerous resolutions and declarations on democratic governance, it
has not been able to implement a program that ensures the credibility of
the electoral process in its Member States.298 Uganda's Yoweri Museveni,
following in the disgraceful footsteps of Guinea's Lansana Conteh and
Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, recently bribed his parliamentarians to
eliminate term limits in the Constitution in order to remain president
indefinitely, if not for life.2 99 Uganda has operated a strange political
system since Museveni came to power 19 years ago. In his desperate
consolidation of power, he has restricted the opposition parties severely:
Political parties are allowed to exist, but candidates for office must run
as individuals, not as representatives of their parties.3 °° In Cameroon, Paul
Biya has spent 23 years in office but his supporters are clamoring for an
297. See Baba Galleh Jallow, Mauritania: An All Too Familiar Story, U.N.
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.allafrica.com/stories/
200508090298.html (arguing that the current scenario in Mauritania is all too familiar to
observers of African politics).
298. See, e.g., Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in
Africa, Org. Afr. Unity/Aft. Union, 38th Ord. Sess., A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.I(XXXVIII)
(July 8, 2002), (laying down principles for the conduct of democratic elections in
Africa). Elections, according to the Declaration, should be conducted "freely and fairly
and under democratic constitutions and in compliance with supportive legal instruments." Id.
at 11(4); see generally Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in
Africa, supra note 253, at 1253-70 (discussing Africa's regional instruments and action
plans on democratic governance).
299. See MlPs Back Museveni Re-election Bid, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, June
28, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4630209.stm (reporting that Ugandan members of
parliament have voted overwhelmingly in favor of a constitutional amendment allowing
President Museveni to seek further terms in office).
300. See Uganda Reveals Democracy Question, BBC NEWS WORLD EDMON, June
9, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4078168.stm.
amendment to the Cameroonian Constitution to allow him serve a third
seven-year term. 30 1 The rest of the democratic world can only marvel at
the steepness of Africa's learning curve.
Africa must embark on internal political and institutional transformations
if only because of the interdependence between good governance and
economic development; neither is possible without the other. "Economic
development stalls when governments do not uphold the rule of law,"
and "upholding the rule of law requires institutions for government
accountability. ' 30 2 Africa must also work to overcome corruption and
conflict, which continue to undermine any external support. "Without
progress in governance," says the Blair Commission Report, "all other
reforms will have limited impact.
3 03
B. Reinvigorating Africa's Economic and Regulatory Frameworks
African states must restructure and reinvigorate their regulatory and
economic policies in order to reduce their marginalization, speed up
their integration into the globalization process, combat poverty, and
achieve the MDG. Trade policies should "promote macroeconomic stability
and higher growth and ... improve the delivery of social services. 30 4
The private sector, both local and international, can only meaningfully
contribute to Africa's development effort if conditions, such as peace
and political stability, are present to promote investment."' Any outside
support will fail as long as Africa fails to create the right conditions for
development.30 6 The temptation always exists to conclude that market
access is the whole development story, but it is not; having the chance is
not equal having the ability. The present writer agrees with the World
Bank that even if:
301. See Tansa Musa, Third Term for Biya?, NEW AFRICAN, July 2005, at 31
(reporting on the opposition to the third term bid for Paul Biya).
302. Investing in Development, supra note 206, at 31.
303. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 14.
304. U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Afr. [UNECA], Economic Report on Africa 2002:
Tracking Performance and Progress, 40 (June 2002) [hereinafter ERA 2002].
305. Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration
in the African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, 13 IND.
INT'L & Comp. L. 185, 223 (2002); cf Yaound6 Declaration, supra note 19, 24.
306. See, e.g., Declaration of International Economic Cooperation, G.A. Res. S-18/3,
23, U.N. GAOR, 18th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/S-18/15 (May 1,
1990) (urging developing nations to achieve "favourable conditions for domestic and
foreign investment"); cf AU Act, supra note 165, at pmbl. (stressing that the promotion
of peace, security and stability is "a prerequisite for the implementation of our
development and integration agenda"); Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-
African Relations, Org. Afr. Unity, 30th Ord. Sess., pmbl., O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.2
(XXX) (June 13-15, 1994) (noting that "every co-operation effort is doomed to failure in
an environment devoid of stability, trust and security").
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developing countries succeed in obtaining access to new markets, they will have
to adopt complementary policies-removing obstacles to private investment,
improving public investment in infrastructure, and providing education-to
ensure that domestic firms respond to new opportunities associated with greater
integration, and that the benefits of integration are transmitted to the poor.
307
African states must take mutually reinforcing actions to accelerate
growth and end years of aid dependency. As a starting point, they should
streamline and strengthen their domestic legal frameworks for doing
business, mindful that legal uncertainties discourage investors and that a
weak legal system undercuts efforts to develop a modem, market-oriented
economy. Many of the laws regulating business transactions in Africa
are not just outdated but antediluvian. To register a business in Ethiopia,
"a would-be entrepreneur must deposit the equivalent of 18 years' average
income in a bank account, which is then frozen;" 30 8 yet experience in
309
several rich countries shows that such capital requirements are unnecessary.
In Nigeria, multiple procedures are required to record or register a
property transaction, 310 and about $6,621 is needed to start a business in
Angola. 311 A continent that is in dire need of boosting FDIs to compete
favorably in the global market cannot afford the luxury of retaining
archaic and retrogressive business laws and regulations. As The Economist
wisely counsels, "there is probably much more to gain from slashing red
tape than from begging for more aid.",
312
A major achievement of the MDG is in galvanizing unprecedented
efforts to meet the needs of the world's poorest people.31 3 It also has
largely succeeded in making governments frame their policies around
specific intended outcomes rather than policy inputs. Allocations of aid,
targets for budget deficits and other policy settings are increasingly being
tested against the final goals.314 African leaders, in particular, have adopted
several policies and action plans-at the country, regional, and continental
levels-towards tackling underdevelopment and poverty. In 2000, Kenya
launched two poverty reduction strategies-the short-term Poverty
307. Global Economic Prospects 2004, supra note 35, at xv-xvi.
308. Measure First, Then Cut, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2004, at 71 (reviewing a
World Bank study showing that bad regulations are a huge brake on global growth).
309. See id.
310. See id. (noting, rather sweepingly, that land is useless as a collateral in Nigeria
because "[i]ts owners typically cannot prove, legally, that they own it").
311. Some Interesting Facts About Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 22.
312. Measure First, Then Cut, supra note 308, at 71.
313. See Kofi Annan, Foreword, in MDG REPORT 2005, supra note 29, at 3.
314. Recasting the Case for Aid, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 67.
Reduction Strategy Paper and the long-term National Poverty Eradication
Plan.31 5 The strategy seeks to reduce poverty by 50 percent by 2015;
empower the poor to earn income; reduce most major forms of inequalities;
and increase productivity through human capital development by
investing in education and health. 31 6
Clearly, more urgent action is needed to translate the MDG into reality
in Africa. The real question, as The Economist correctly notes, is the
kind of policy input that will be required to hit the targets set by the
MDG. 317 The heterogeneity of African economies in terms of size and
resource endowments evidently limits choices available to African states.
Nonetheless, these states should reform their agricultural policies, since
agriculture is the dominant sector of the continent's economy. They should
subsidize agriculture and make fertilizers available and affordable to
rural farmers. Most farmers in Africa farm in soil that is increasingly
depleted of nutrients, and cannot afford much fertilizer because of high
transportation costs. 3 18 Yet, growth in agriculture has a disproportionately
positive effect on poverty reduction, especially as more than half of
Africa's population lives in rural areas, where poverty is highest. 319
Agricultural reform will ensure food security for Africa's growing
population, provide industrial raw materials, employment with income that
is sufficient to ensure decent living standards, and much needed foreign
exchange earnings.
African states should also adopt policies that promote export
diversification favoring higher value-added industrial and service
sectors. They should develop new industries and upgrade existing ones,
particularly in areas where they have comparative advantages, including
agro-based industries, energy and mineral resource-based industries.320
They should increase investment in infrastructure, health, human resource
development and education. States that do not have industrial development
policies and strategies should formulate them in collaboration with the
private sector, which is the engine of economic growth. Finally, African
countries should form cartels to control their commodity exports. They
should set aside resources as a way to add value to their raw materials
315. See Government of Kenya, Kenya: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
2000-2003, July 13, 2000, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/
NP/prsp/2000/ken/01/kenya.pdf.
316. Id. at 13.
317. Recasting the Casefor Aid, supra note 314, at 67.
318. See Investing in Development, supra note 206, at 150.
319. ERA 2003, supra note 84, at 5 (noting that poverty is more severe in rural
Africa because, "[h]ouseholds in remote areas, living on fragile lands, would be expected
to have fewer opportunities and face greater risks and vulnerability than households in
better-endowed areas.").
320. NEPAD, supra note 13, 162.
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before exporting them.321 "Even if Africa cannot control the prices of its
exports, but can only influence them," says Cameron Duodu, "the continent
wouldn't need anyone's assistance to end its poverty. 322
Clearly, Africa's development is the primary responsibility of Africa,
a point that has been repeatedly stressed both by the U.N.323 and the
extinct OAU.324 The present writer agrees wholeheartedly with the Blair
Commission Report, which unambiguously stated:
It is for Africa to create the conditions where the entrepreneurship and creativity
of its people can flourish and drive growth. It is for Africa to take the lead in
creating health and education systems which can deliver investment in its
people. It is for Africa to take the lead in creating the peace and security
without which no development can happen. 325
C. Entrenching the Human Dimension in Development Policies
Since every action and pursuit must aim at some good, it is imperative for
Africa to entrench the human dimension in all development policies.
Humanity must be the objective and supreme beneficiary of development,
otherwise development becomes a meaningless vanity and vexation of
the spirit. As the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) maintained:
[C]omprehensive development cannot be fully achieved until the impoverished
have gained access to the essential attributes of dignity; a goal that can be
achieved only by combating all forms of destitution and marginalization and
321. See Duodu, supra note 64, at 15.
322. Id.
323. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2542, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (Dec. 11, 1969) (noting that "the primary responsibility for the development of
the developing countries rests on those countries themselves"); U.N. Secretary General,
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 189, U.N. Doc.
A/56/1 (2001) ("While international support remains essential, ultimately African
countries themselves are best placed to overcome the pressing challenges that confront
the continent... ").
324. See, e.g., Declaration on the Economic Situation in Africa, Org. Afr. Unity,
21st Ord. Sess., 6, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.1 (XXI) (July 18-20, 1985), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/Official documents/Heads%20of/o20State%20Summits/
hog/uHoGAssembly 1 985.pdf ("We re-affirm that the development of our continent is the
primary responsibility of our Governments and people."); Declaration on the Socio-
Economic Situation in Africa, supra note 68, 8 ("We reaffirm that Africa's development
is the responsibility of our governments and peoples."); NEPAD, supra note 13, 203
("In proposing the partnership, Africa recognises that it holds the key to its own
development.").
325. Our Common Interest, supra note 14, at 89 (stressing, "If Africa fails to do all
this, the international community will find it far more difficult to discharge its responsibilities,
act in solidarity with Africa and deliver effective support.").
making enhanced solidarity among all members of the national community an
essential basis for all the reforms introduced.
326
The now defunct OAU expressed the same sentiment in its 1996
Yaound6 Declaration: "Sustainable development aims primarily at ensuring
a better standard of living for present and future generations .... [It] is
founded on democracy, human rights, good governance, human resource
promotion, economic and social development, environmental protection,
all with the human being, as the focal point." 327 Africa should translate
such rhetoric into reality by uniting economic and social policies to
spread protection against poverty to everyone. Governance, says Shedrack
Agbakwa, "ceases to be meaningful when the majority of the people is
[sic] put in a situation where it cannot appreciate the value of life, let
alone enjoy its benefits. 328
Many Africans are not particularly enthused by their leaders' annual
rendezvous with the G8 when they gather to discuss generalities and
inanities. After more than four decades of independence, Africans no
longer expect their leaders to behave like patients newly released from
an intensive care unit. It is sheer hype to hope that the G8, IFIs, WTO,
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 329 or any other Western
contraption will "make poverty history" in Africa. The simple reason, as
Duodu proverbially expresses, is that "it is not very sensible, if you are
drowning in a river to expect a crocodile to offer you its tail to ferry
you safely ashore.' 330 Besides, fighting poverty and adopting compensatory
policies are, in the words of Jack Donnelly, "functions of the state and
not of the market. These are demands related to justice, rights and
obligations, and not to efficiency.... Markets are simply unable to
deal with them... because they have no vocation for this."331
326. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Second Periodic Reports Submitted
by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, 5, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/
Add. 14 (Oct. 8, 1996), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
E. 1990.6.Add. 14.En?Opendocument.
327. Yaound6 Declaration, supra note 19, 19.
328. Shedrack C. Agbakwa, Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 177,
181 (2002).
329. The AGOA was enacted into law in the U.S. as part of the Trade and
Development Act of 2000 (African Trade Bill), 19 U.S.C. §§ 3702(1), (4), (5) (2000),
2001 O.J. (L60). It is a part of the "post-Cold War constructive re-engagement" in Africa
and is based on the philosophy that trade, not aid is the chief tool for promoting
economic development. See Jeffery M. Brown, Black Internationalism: Embracing an
Economic Paradigm, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 807, 862 (2002).
330. Duodu, supra note 64, at 15.
331. Jack Donnelly, Ethics and International Human Rights, in ETHICS AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 153 (2001); cf. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 160 (1998) (noting: "Markets seek efficiency and not social justice or human
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The A.U., which carries the heavy burden of history, must urge its
Members States to take tangible measures that will deliver basic needs to
its citizens. These include nutritional food, affordable housing, clean
drinking water, effective and affordable drugs, reliable electricity and
telecommunications, functional educational systems, and efficient
transportation networks. Unless the A.U. works to translate the noble
goals of the A.U. Act into reality, it risks being dismissed as another
mutual adoration club, like the OAU. Basic needs are not unattainable,
really, and the sacrifice is not so great as it seems. Citizens of other less
endowed but better managed societies take these things for granted,
while also enjoying "milk and butter, very fresh flowers in front of the
window, [and] a few beautiful trees in front of the door., 332 In most of
Africa, the idea of meeting basic needs has remained a forlorn and
frozen hope, with citizens left on their own, as it were, to shovel "snow
in zero weather... just to put food in [their] belly."33 A country that cannot
feed its population should have no claim to any kind of sovereignty.
V. THE SUMMER HAS ENDED...
The assertion that Africa has found the elusive Golden Fleece of
sustainable development and prosperity cannot be made with confidence,
despite the debt relief promised by the G8 at its 2005 Summer Summit.
The average African has become cynical a propos these gestures, given
the history of failed declarations, summits, conferences, commissions, and
action plans. Even actual development assistance has failed to produce
growth and prosperity, obstructed by conflicts, corruption, and endemic
mismanagement compounded by what Kenneth Karl calls the "shifting
power play on the world's geopolitical chessboard, coupled with the
demands of galloping globalisation. 3 34 All of this explains why the summer
of great expectations is giving way to another winter of depression and
despair. Unnecessary destitution still persists in Africa because, to borrow
Ringen's words, "the will to end it comes not from our hearts, where we
rights for all"); GEWIRTH, supra note 160, at 59 (arguing that markets cannot guarantee
sufficient funds to meet basic goods and opportunities, which "must be securely
provided as needed" and, therefore, that "the state, as a community of rights, should be
the primary, even if not the only, respondent of these rights").
332. FREUD, supra note 5, at 59 (citing Heine).
333. JAMES BALDWTN, EARLY NOVELS AND SHORT STORIES 21 (1998).
334. Kenneth Karl, From Georgetown to Cotonou: The ACP Group Faces Up to
New Challenges, ACP-EU COURIER, Sept. 2000, at 20, 23, available at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/courier/courier acp/en/en_020.pdf.
are all pure, but from our collective opinions and actions, where we are
not.
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Some think that Africa is predestined to be poor, that some long-lost
ancient curses are causing its failures and poverty. These troubling,
reckless, and irritating assertions have contributed to Africa's inadequate
self-image in the comity of nations. Those who make these claims fail to
acknowledge that Africa was the cradle of civilization 336 and that ancient
Egypt provided the first reliable system of irrigation known to mankind,
besides its skills in architecture, writing and painting.337 Understanding
and appreciating Africa's contribution to human existence is a part of the
process of reconstructing the identity and self-confidence of its peoples.338
Africa's poverty is not a strand in the tapestry of primordial causation;
many of the difficulties the continent is currently facing are home-made
and, from a universal perspective, wholly unnecessary. It is the lack of
visionary leadership or the pursuit of an alien vision that accounts for
Africa's inability to harness its abundant human and natural resources to
lift its citizens out of economic scarcity.
The poverty of leadership in Africa has persisted largely due to the
poverty of the constituency. Until recently, Africans were so accustomed to
the diffused darkness of dictatorship and tyranny that they found it
difficult to raise themselves up to the penetrating lights of democracy,
human rights and good governance. When one lives everyday in the
midst of absurdity, it becomes far too easy to behave respectfully to it.
The current challenge for all Africans, both at home and in the Diaspora,
is to engage their leaders constructively and to work with them to
reconstruct and transform the continent. The human entity is endowed with
intelligence and vision to regulate its conduct and constantly recreate
its existence. Africa is no exception. Although sorrow always longs
for someone to blame, it is no longer reasonable to keep blaming the
North for much of Africa's woes. A people cannot escape the judgment
of history by seeking to transfer their own share of guilt to scapegoat
international institutions or rich nation clubs.
335. Ringen, supra note 21, at 3.
336. Our Common Destiny, supra note 16, at 3 ("Africa was the birthplace and
source of civilization for the longest period in the history of humanity, a period that
people persist in describing wrongly, as "Prehistoric" using one sole criterion-'lack of
written records."'); see also NEPAD, supra note 13, 14 ("Modem science recognizes
Africa as the cradle of humankind . . . Africa's status as the birthplace of humanity
should be cherished by the whole world as the origin of all its peoples.").
337. See generally GEORGE GUEST, THE MARCH OF CIVILIZATION (1974).
338. See NEPAD, supra note 13, 14.
